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Abstract 
A plethora of the existing scholarship on child soldiering in Africa shows that armed 
conflicts are associated with human suffering borne by the civilian population who 
are targeted by the warring parties and pay the heaviest costs. Big variations exist 
with regard to the extent civilians suffer at the hands of the warring factions over 
time, across conflicts, and across countries experiencing civil wars. This research 
explores conditions for the use of child soldiers in Africa which is an issue of high 
importance and remains an under-researched field. A juxtaposition of Angola and 
Mozambique civil wars show that more child soldiers were used in the Mozambican 
war than in the Angolan civil war. Pulling the various strands together, as well as 
theoretical insights, I find an alternative understanding in regard to the variance in 
the use of child soldiers in the two civil wars. The variance was due to the nature of 
contemporary conflicts, lack of institutional structures on part of the rebels and 
means of control to account for their forces, unpopular policy of villagization in 
Mozambique, high levels of economic marginalisation and exclusion, recruitment 
policy of government and rebel forces, influence of traditional leaders and churches 
as well as the use of foreign actors and private companies in Angola. 
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Chapter One 
 
Background Information 
Introduction  
Armed conflicts are associated by human suffering which is mainly borne by the civilian 
population as they are targeted by the warring parties. Civilians pay the heaviest costs 
regardless of the earlier image by Mao Tse-tung of the rebels operating to win the hearts 
and minds of the populace.
1
 Since 1945, civil wars have caused more than 16.2 million 
deaths in 75 out of 127 conflicts.
2
 More to this are the indirect costs of internal conflict 
which are estimated to be much greater such as disease, famine and economic disruption 
due to the war.
3
 However, big variations exist in regards to the extent civilians suffer at the 
hands of the warring factions over time, across conflicts, and in countries experiencing 
civil wars. For example, the violence in Colombia resulted in less than 20,000 deaths in 
about 40 years, while about 100,000 deaths were registered in eastern Congo in six years.
4
 
 
Different armed groups exhibit different patterns of behaviour in dealing with civilian 
populations.
5
 This can take the form of launching campaigns of ethnic cleansing, 
displacement, extermination
6
 and abduction of children to fill the ranks of government or 
rebel forces
7
 as seen in Rwanda, Colombia and Northern Uganda. Some armed groups 
have shown restraint in their relationship with civilians and perpetrated low levels of 
violence.
8
 Other armies like in Sri Lanka and Colombia put in place structures of 
command, control and accountability to check abuses committed against non-combatants.
9
 
Of great concern in Africa is that children and youth have become stakeholders and have 
been used in political campaigns, liberation struggles and insurgencies as they form a 
                                                          
1
 Nicholai Lidow. (2010). Rebel Governance and Civilian Abuse: Comparing Liberia’s Rebels Using Satellite 
Data. Available: www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/wgape/papers/1  Lidow.pdf . Accessed: 06-06-2913. 
2
 James Fearon & David Laitin. ((2003). Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War. American Political Science 
Review. 97: 75-90. 
3
 Hazem Ghobarah, Paul Huth & Bruce Russett. (2003). Civil Wars Kill and Maim People- Long after the 
Shooting Stops. American Political Science Review. 97: 189-202. 
4
 Bethany Lacina & Nils Petter Gleditsch. (2005). Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: a New Data Set of 
Battle Deaths. European Journal of Population. 21:145-66. 
5
 Simon Chesterman. (2001). Civilians in War. Lynne Rienner. Boulder. 
6
 Gerrad Prunier. (1997). The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide. Colombia University Press. New York. 
7
 Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers (CSUCH). (2005). Child Soldiers Global Report, 2004. London. 
8
 Jeremy Weinstein. (2005). Resources and the Information Problem in Rebel Recruitment. Journal of 
Conflict Resolution. 49: 598-624. 
9
 Marcartan Humphreys & Jeremy Weinstein. (2006). Handling and Manhandling Civilians in Civil war. 
American Political Science Review. 100(3): 429-447. 
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significant majority of the population of most African countries.
10
 Therefore, examining 
the usage of child soldiers and variations in conflicts thus involves an examination of a 
plethora of factors and an analysis of the strategies and tactics used by armed groups in 
their interaction with civilians. 
 
Aim  
The aim of this research is to investigate or explore why child soldiers have been used in 
some conflicts in Africa but relative absence in others. In this research I will consider the 
factors that led to the use of child soldiers in the Angolan civil war (1975-1994) and the 
Mozambican civil war (1976-1992). Reports show that in the Mozambican civil war 
25,498 child soldiers out of 92,881 combatants were used representing a total of 28% while 
in the Angolan civil war 8,000 child soldiers out of 194,000 combatants were used 
representing only 4% of combatants.
11
 This research will enable me to understand the 
factors that led to the use of child soldiers, how and why the phenomenon of child soldiers 
takes place in different contexts in order to develop an integrated comparative analysis 
between different conflict situations. The research will further help in bringing more 
awareness on the plight of children in conflicts; suggest improvements and intervention for 
children affected by armed conflicts in developing countries. Moreover, the study will 
complement the efforts of actors who are providing assistance to child soldiers affected by 
armed conflicts like national governments, civil societies, international and local Non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), and United Nations (UN) agencies. 
 
Rationale 
Africa has been faced with a number of armed conflicts over a long time. In many of these 
armed conflicts the phenomenon of the use of child soldiers has been a major cause of 
concern. Further evidence on the issue suggests that the use of child soldiers have 
increased significantly over the years, and that the problem will continue if not addressed.
12
 
According to the International Action Network on Small Arms, Safer World and Oxfam 
International, between 1990 and 2005, 23 African nations have been involved in armed 
conflicts where child soldiers have been used. Some of the countries involved include 
                                                          
10
 Angela McIntyre. (2005). Invisible Stakeholders in Africa: Children and War in Africa. Insitute for 
Security Studies. Pretoria. South Africa. 
11
 Simon F. Reich & Vera Achvarina. (2005). Why Do Children Fight? Explaining Child Soldier Ratios in 
African Intra-State Conflicts. Ford Institute for Human Security. 
12
 UNICEF. (1996). Children in War: UNICEF Report Finds Number of Child Soldiers Growing. Available: 
http://www.unicef.org/sowc96/2csoldrs.htm. Accessed: 30-05-2013. 
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Sierra Leone, Burundi, Liberia, Rwanda, Angola, Uganda and Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC), just to mention a few. Interestingly, Africa has provided the largest number 
of conflicts in the world as well as child soldier participation.
13
 Furthermore, it is estimated 
that about 120,000 children were active in Africa at the beginning of this century making 
Africa the largest single continent in terms of child soldier usage and the fastest growing 
region in terms of child soldiers in recent years followed by East Asia and the Pacific.
14
 
 
However, the root causes of conflicts in Africa have been the subject of much debate while 
the nature of violence has been poorly understood by many. In contrast to the stereotypes 
of “ethnic” conflict in Africa, some evidence appears to show that Africa’s great ethnic 
diversity actually reduces, rather than increases, the chances of conflict occurring.  In some 
cases though, it seems that where one ethnic group is numerically dominant this may 
increase the chances of conflict
15
 (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Elbadawi and Sambanis, 
2000; and Arvind and Vines, 2004). In these cases it therefore seems that power and elite’s 
manipulation of ethnic identity becomes a major driving force. Furthermore, my 
observation is that the sources of conflict in Africa reflect the diversity and complexity of 
Africa’s past and present as I explain below.  
 
While some sources of conflict are purely internal, some reflect the dynamics of a 
particular sub-region, and some have important international dimensions. According to the 
2003 Commission on Human Security, the sources of conflict in Africa are linked by a 
number of common themes and experiences, and may be caused by: competition over land 
and resources, sudden and deep political or economic transitions, growing inequity among 
people and communities; increasing crime, corruption and illegal activities, weak and 
unstable political regimes and institutions; and identity politics and historical legacies, such 
as colonialism. However, in most cases, economic motivation has become the main cause. 
 
                                                          
13
 Laura Barnitz. (1999). Child Soldiers: Youth Who Participate in Armed Conflict. 2nd. Youth Advocate 
Program International Washington. pp. 2-3. 
14
 The Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers. (2000). The Use of Children as Soldiers in Africa: A 
Country Analysis of Child Recruitment and Participation in Armed Conflict. Available:  
http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/chilsold.htm. Accessed: 30-05-2013; Afua Twum-Danso. (2003). 
Africa's Young Soldiers: The Co-option of Childhood. Monograph 82. Institute for Security Studies. 
http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No82/Content.html, p.8. 
15
 Cutler J. Cleveland. (2007). Armed Conflict in Africa: A Threat to Regional Cooperation. United Nations 
Environment Programme. Available: 
http://www.eoearth.org/article/Armed_conflict_in_Africa:_a_threat_to_regional_cooperation. Accessed: 01-
04-2013. 
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These wars affect the political and governance systems, investment and economic growth 
of a country, and places stress on the environment as well as contributing to the 
overexploitation of natural resources. In the same vein, natural resources have been 
acknowledged as a factor in influencing or prolonging some of these conflicts in Africa. 
Furthermore, almost $300 billion has been squandered on these armed conflicts by 
governments and rebel forces to sustain the war.
16
 This money could have been used to lift 
the continent out of the many problems being faced like extreme poverty, prevention of 
disease epidemics, or provide education and build roads which could affect millions of 
people positively. 
 
What is more worrying is that, these civil wars have taken the lives of millions of people 
since the end of the Cold War, including more than two million children while many more 
have been left physically and mentally damaged.
17
 While the rebel factions deny recruiting 
and training children in many of these conflicts, some children boast to their friends that 
they are acquainted with the use of arms as they have received training from certain 
factions. Although children are used as soldiers in various Asian countries, parts of Latin 
America, Europe and Middle East, the problem is most serious in Africa where children as 
young as nine have been involved in armed conflicts
18
 as pointed out above. 
 
Literature Review  
According to Ball, the proliferation of violent conflicts has been one of the distinguishing 
features in the modern world as over 150 conflicts have been registered worldwide since 
the end of the Cold War including 39 major ones in the last decade of the twentieth 
century.
19
 In armed conflicts, different actors are motivated by different reasons and this is 
reflected in how wars are fought and motives of the groups involved in the fighting. In 
some conflicts external players have been recruited and used like children, diasporas, 
mercenaries, international organisations and other various actors bearing significant 
implications on the dynamics of the conflict. In this regard, new conflicts are very different 
                                                          
16
 Safeworld. (2008). Conflict-sensitive Development. Available: 
http://www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/Conflict-sensitive%20dev%20May%2008.pdf.Accessed: 
01-04-2013. 
17
 Graca Machel. (1996). Impact of Armed Conflict on Children. United Nations. New York. 
18
 Joe Becker & Tony Tate. (2003). Stolen Children: Abduction and Recruitment in Northern Uganda. 
Human Rights Watch. Available: http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/uganda0303/uganda0403.pdf. Accessed: 
30-2013. 
19
 N. Ball. (1996). The challenge of Rebuilding war Torn Societies, in CA Crocker, F.O. Hampson and P. 
Aall (eds), Managing Global Chaos: sources of and Responces to International Conflict. United States 
institute of Peace. Washington, DC. 
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from the traditional wars of the last century as they are much more fragmented and take 
place against the backdrop of a weakened or collapsing formal economy and 
infrastructure.
20
 External funding, appropriation of humanitarian assistance and illicit 
activities of combatants have often become the main source of funding to support the war 
effort. This therefore accounts for the high incidence of civilian victims and participation 
as incidences of torture, murder and displacement of civilians figure highly. 
 
According to Chesterman, rebel groups demonstrate totally different patterns of behaviour 
in their interaction with civilians.
21
 While some rebel factions have engaged in ethnic 
cleansing campaigns, some have abducted children to fill their ranks and file, others have 
perpetrated low levels of violence and exhibited restraint in their relationship with 
civilians. Some have gone further to set formal structures of command, control and 
accountability to check abuses committed by combatants against civilians as well as 
engaging military targets only.
22
 Wood observed that for the armed group to enforce which 
choice to take depends on the strength of the group’s hierarchy or chain of command, 
whether superiors punish subordinates for infractions and also on the group’s norms 
concerning violence against civilians.
23
 
 
Furthermore, Moss notes that, “conflict has multiple costs, not least the terrible human 
toll”.24 While in Africa the exact number of deaths caused by wars is not known, it is 
believed to be in the millions, with extremely high economic costs. At the individual level, 
armed conflict impacts differently depending on the extent to which politicians and 
military commanders gain financially from it. This often becomes an incentive for fighting 
as the combatants may profit through looting, pay and other benefits, however many 
fighters are involuntarily recruited and get involved as a means of survival. It also needs to 
be noted that due to the violence, rape, use of children as soldiers and human trafficking, 
social cohesion is broken which ultimately means more conflict. 
 
                                                          
20
 Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic. (2002). The World Bank, NGOs, and the Private Sector in post War 
Reconstruction. International Peacekeeping. 9(2): 81-89. 
21
 Simon Chesterman. (2001). Civilians in War. Lynne Reinner. Boulder. 
22
 Macartan Humphreys & Jeremy M. Weinstein. (2006). Handling and Manhandling Civilians in Civil war. 
American Political Science Review. 100(3): 429-447. 
23
 Elisabeth Jean Wood. (2009). Armed Groups and Sexual Violence: When is Wartime Rape Rare? Politics 
& Society. 37(1): 131-162. 
24
 Todd J. Moss. (2011). African Development: Making Sense of the Issues and Actors. 2
nd
 Ed. Lynne Rienner 
Publishers. London. 
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According to Human Rights Watch,
25
 increasing numbers of children have become 
participants in war around the world, being denied their freedom and subjected to violence, 
with more than 300,000 serving in armed conflicts.
26
 These conflicts result in high levels of 
civilian casualties regardless of being under the protection of the International Law 
(Geneva Protocols, 1977) due to the fact that especially rebel factions, not being states are 
not signatories to the treaties regulating the conduct of hostilities so consequentially such 
principles are not universally adhered to. Many governments also turn a blind eye to these 
norms. According to Davison, two million children died and six million were wounded as a 
result of conflicts globally between 1994 and 2004.
27
 Majekodunmi observes that in some 
conflicts children are deliberately targeted because of their iconic value, representing both 
innocence, and society’s future which renders them potent in pressurising populations as 
they represent potential. In some cases children are employed as human shields or killed by 
terrorists. Though this tactic is uncommon, it is seen as a convenient way to get attention. 
Today, as many as 90 per cent of war victims are civilians and about half of them are 
children.
28
 
 
DiCicco and Human Rights Watch observed that children are likely to be involved in 
armed conflict or become child soldiers if they are poor, separated from their families, 
displaced from their homes, or living in a combat zone or have limited access to education. 
Children may also be lured into becoming child soldiers by social causes, religious 
freedoms and ideas of national liberation. However, not all children join willingly as some 
are abducted from homes, schools, hospitals and marketplaces; and are later forced to 
attack men, women and other children in order to desensitize them to violence. Child 
soldiers who do not attack on command are executed or beaten; therefore, most children 
commit unspeakable acts when ordered by their commanders.
29
 
 
It is also worth noting that according to Ansell, children are involved in conflict as both 
victims and soldiers. Over the past years the age of many recruits has aroused international 
                                                          
25
 Human Rights Watch. (2003). The Landmine Monitor. Available: www.hrw.org. Accessed: 01-04-2013. 
26
 S. Chesterman. (2001). Civilians in War. Lynne Rienner. USA.  p.43. 
27
 A. Davison. (2004). Child soldiers: No longer a minor incident. 12 Willamette Journal of International 
Law and Dispute Resolution 124 at 144. 
28
 Majekodunmi, B. (1999). Protection in Practice: the Protection of children’s Rights in Situations of Armed 
Conflict: UNICEF Experience in Burundi. Florence, UNICEF Innocent Research Centre. 
29
 Lucia DiCicco. (2009). Former Child Soldiers face Psychological Battle. Available: 
http://www.thestar.com/printArticle/627688. Accessed: 01-04-2013. 
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alarm.
30
 Between 1994 and 1998, 35 armed conflicts had soldiers under the age of 15
31
 
which is against International Law.  The international community has defined child 
soldiers as victims rather than perpetrators, hence absolving them of responsibility for their 
actions. In developing countries children are recruited by both government and rebel 
groups as they are plentiful; the easy availability of small arms including semi-automatic 
rifles such as AK47s which are easy to carry and operate, coupled with the fact that 
children are energetic and undemanding. Ansell further states that, not all children are 
recruited by force like kidnapping. Some volunteer due to intimidation and fear, poverty, 
unemployment, quest for adventure inspired by films and books or by political reasons.
32
 
McKay and Mazurana found evidence that females were being press-ganged or abducted 
although agencies such as the War Child and others that campaign on behalf of child 
soldiers tell mainly about their abduction.
33
  
 
Wilson, in regards to the recruitment of children by Mozambican National Resistance 
(RENAMO), has emphasized the adaptability and malleability of young abductees and 
stressed the significance not only of abduction but also of traumatic initiation as a way of 
breaking links with a social past and creating a loyal cadre totally dependent on the 
movement.
34
 These young men and women may lack proper understanding of the conflict 
to have informed opinions and may end up being victims of radicalisation.  
 
All this happen contrary to a number of human rights instruments which seek to enshrine 
rights and freedoms for all people such as the Universal Declaration for Human Rights, the 
1949 Geneva Convention (Art IV) which protects children from taking part in hostilities, 
the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, the African Charter on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child (Art 15) and the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 
which bans compulsory recruitment under the age of 18. Nevertheless these instruments 
have done little to curb the use of child soldiers in many conflicts some being as young as 
eight years old.
35
 
                                                          
30
 Nicola Ansell. (2005). Children, Youth and Development. Routledge. London and New York. 
31
 Hoiskar, AH. (2001). Underage and Underfire: An Enquiry into the use of Child Soldiers 1994-8. 
Childhood. 8: 340-360. 
32
  Nicola Ansell. (2005). Loc Cit. 
33
 Susan McKay & Dyan Mazurana. (2002). Girls in Militaries, Paramilitaries, and Armed Opposition 
Groups: a Preliminary Review for 1990-2000. Available : www.waraffectedchildren.gc.ca/girls-e.asp. 
34
 Wilson, K. (1992). Cults of Violence and Counter-Violence in Mozambique. Journal of Southern African 
Studies. 18: 527-582. 
35
 www.un.org/rights/concerns.htm; www.hrw.org/topic/childrens-rights/child-soldiers. 
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This research therefore will try to explore the variance in the use of child soldiers in 
African armed conflict. Specifically it will look at why more child soldiers were used in the 
Mozambican civil war than in the Angolan war. The two cases are similar in that they were 
Portuguese colonies, experienced armed struggle for liberation soon after independence in 
1975 by opposition parties RENAMO and National Union for the Total independence of 
Angola (UNITA) respectively, both adopted a Marxist orientation and social model of 
development.  
 
Theoretical Foundation 
The world has been hit with violent confrontations since human evolution, the history of 
man being punctuated by a multitude of battles and humiliating defeats leaving behind 
wholesale massacres. Conflicts are increasingly occurring within and not between states 
which mean that there are a lot of civilians including women and children involved in the 
conflict. This result in millions being killed, displaced, as refugees and children being used 
as soldiers. A number of theories explain why conflicts occur and this study posits two 
complementary theories to explain the involvement of children in armed conflict. Below, I 
explain the Economic Roots Theory and the Relative Deprivation Theory which will help 
in explaining and understanding why child soldiers have been employed in conflicts in 
Africa. 
 
The Economic Roots Theory (ERT)
36
 locates the root causes of conflict in a failed 
economy, a weak state and a poor country with an unequal distribution of incomes among 
the people run by a dictatorial regime. War lords and violence entrepreneurs organize 
unemployed youths into armed groups and are motivated by political goals. Over time they 
engage in criminal activities in order to finance the struggle and later become entrenched in 
armed conflict as a way of life. Combatants benefit from appropriating revenues from 
natural resources such as diamonds, petroleum, timber and other export commodities, 
which finance the civil war and stimulate demands for secessionism. Once started, armed 
fighting has a tremendous momentum based on positive feedback referred to as the 
“conflict trap”.  Accordingly, in order for conflict resolution to occur, violence has to be 
contained, anarchy prevented, and security of life and property provided before peace and 
                                                          
36
 Collier, Paul et al. (2003). Breaking the Conflict Trap. Civil War and Development Policy.  World Bank. 
Washington D.C. 
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reconstruction can take root. According to this theory, the key root cause of conflict is the 
failure of economic development.
37
 
 
The Relative Deprivation Theory (RDT) explains the feeling of being denied something 
and refers to the discrepancy between value expectation and value achievement.
38
 Schaefer 
defines it as "the conscious experience of a negative discrepancy between legitimate 
expectations and present actualities”.39 In Social Science it is more about feelings or 
measures of political, social or economic deprivation that are relative rather than absolute. 
It also has important significances for both behaviour and attitudes, including feelings of 
stress, political attitudes, and participation in collective action. Therefore, these theories 
can help explain why child soldiers were used in Mozambique and Angola civil wars as 
they point us to a direct correlation between war, poverty and economic deprivation. Put 
differently, it is the environment of war that is the root cause of the problems. 
 
Research Question  
This research will explore the following question: why are child soldiers used in some 
conflicts in Africa and not in others? To answer this question Mozambique and Angola will 
be used as comparative case studies. 
 
Hypotheses 
This study will be guided by the following hypotheses: 
H1 If there is high levels of poverty then child soldiers are more likely to be used during 
conflict. 
H2 If there is high levels of unemployment then child soldiers are more likely to be used 
during conflict. 
H3 If there is high levels of ethnic fractionalization then child soldiers are more likely to be 
used in armed conflict. 
H4 If there are insufficient numbers of military personnel then child soldiers are going to 
be recruited into the armed groups. 
H5 If the group’s hierarchy fails to punish subordinates for infractions or lacks group 
norms concerning violence against civilians then more child soldiers will be used. 
                                                          
37
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Methodology 
The methodology of this research is qualitative and inductive in nature. According to 
McRoy, qualitative research is all about exploring issues, understanding social phenomena, 
answering questions, and is more concerned with nonstatistical methods of inquiry;
40
 and 
an inductive method  is about moving from specific observations to broader generalizations 
and theories; and it is therefore called a "bottom- up" approach. The research will rely 
mainly on secondary data obtained from memoirs, expert surveys, books, electronic 
journals, scholarly articles, and other written materials. The UN and other credible 
websites will also be used as primary data. The University of the Witwatersrand Library 
will be used extensively and the South Africa Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), 
reputed to have the richest library on African politics. 
 
Multiple case study analysis is used of Angola and Mozambique. These cases have been 
chosen because they are both in Africa and were Portuguese colonies. The wars happened 
almost the same time soon after independence and lasted for long period, 16 years for 
Mozambique and more than 20 for Angola. The cases will also provide variance and bias 
will be avoided. Furthermore, according to George and Bennet, a case study method 
provides opportunities for inductively identifying complex interaction effects.
41
 Therefore, 
these cases provide the necessary condition for exploring the use of child soldiers in 
Africa. 
 
Due to the nature of the study, process tracing is used to investigate and explore the 
variance in the use of child soldiers in the selected case studies. George and Bennet noted 
that, process tracing method identifies a causal chain and casual mechanism that link 
independent and dependent variables. Methodologically, it helps us to know mechanism 
based accounts of social change and to trace the process in a very specific and theoretical 
way.
42
  Process tracing further allows the researcher to take equifinality into account and 
consider alternative paths through which the outcome could have occurred. 
 
                                                          
40
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Operationalization of Independent Variables and Dependent Variable 
In this study the independent variables are the high levels of poverty, high levels of 
unemployment, high levels of ethnic fractionalization and failure to punish subordinates for 
infractions or lack of group norms concerning violence against civilians by the hierarchy. 
The dependent variable is the use of child soldiers in armed conflict. However, some 
concepts in this study may be repeatedly used and therefore needs to define them. 
 
Armed conflict: is defined by the Uppsala Conflict Data Project as a contested 
incompatibility that concerns government or territory or both where the use of armed force 
between two parties results in at least 25 battle-related deaths. Of these two parties, at least 
one is the government of a state.
43
 
Children: any person under the age of eighteen. This is consistent with the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (Article 1), the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the 
Child (Article 2) and International Labour Organization Convention No. 182 on the Worst 
Forms of Child Labour (Article 2).
44
 
Child Soldier: the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC 1989) defines a child 
soldier as any combatant under the age of 18 who is or who has been recruited or used by 
an armed force or armed group. 
Combatant: is defined using International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and UN 
definitions, as any persons who are reported as being part of any kind of regular or 
irregular armed force in any capacity, including but not limited to participation in combat, 
laying mines or explosives, serving as a cook or domestic labourer, decoy, courier, guide, 
guard, porter, or spy, trained or drilled as a combatant, or serving as a sexual servant or 
slave.
45
 
Economic deprivation: situation in which a person lacks the monetary resource to live at 
the same level of those around him or her.
46
 
Poverty: According to United Nations, poverty is a denial of choices and opportunities, a 
violation of human dignity, lack of basic capacity to participate effectively in society, not 
having enough to feed and cloth oneself and/or family, no access to school, clinics, land or 
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employment. It means insecurity, powerlessness, susceptibility to violence, and it often 
implies living on marginal or fragile environments, without access to clean water or 
sanitation.
47
 
Recruitment: Refers to the means by which people become (formally or informally) 
members of armed forces or armed groups. 
War: at least 1,000 battle-related deaths per year
48
. 
 
Limitation of the Research 
The research is desk top based and as such only primary and secondary data will be used. 
The study findings cannot be generalised as it will be done in the context of Angola and 
Mozambique. Limited time, space and financial constraints will not allow the researcher to 
cover a wide area. Brocklehurst has observed that researching child soldiers is fraught with 
difficult as they may not be in a safe position to give out information about the roles played 
during the armed conflict. Moreover, post war research may further bring challenges of 
secondary trauma and imagined risk of recrimination as well as shame which may prevent 
them from revealing their roles in the conflict.
49
 Nevertheless, limiting the research to the 
two case studies will allow me to look at the issue in depth. 
 
Chapterisation of the Study 
This chapter (Chapter 1) provides the background information to the research.  
 
Chapter 2 continues with the historical overview. This part looks at why child soldiers have 
been used in armed conflicts in Africa, how they have been used and the absence of child 
soldiers in conflicts or why there are variations in their usage. It also reflects at the top-
down and bottom-up implications of using child soldiers in armed conflict.  
 
Chapter 3 lays out the empirical similarities of Angola and Mozambique. This part gives 
the background of the two civil wars. It then moves on to look at the factors that led to the 
use of child soldiers in Angola and Mozambique civil wars, how children were recruited 
and why. But it also reflects on the rebel agendas during civil war and child recruitment, 
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roles of female combatants, control and assimilation of children into soldiers and why there 
was variance in the use of children in that more child soldiers were used in Mozambique 
than in Angola over almost the same period. The social impact and reintegration of child 
soldiers is also examined. Chapter 4 discusses and provides an answer to the relative 
variance in the use of child soldiers in Mozambican and Angolan war. This part also looks 
at the social impact of using children as soldiers and their reintegration into society. The 
programs initiated and the problems encountered during the DDR are identified and 
highlighted in both cases. This is meant to show if the child soldiers were successfully 
disarmed, demobilized and reintegrated into society. 
 
Chapter 5 looks at the legal environment child soldiers operated in, the human rights 
abuses experienced and the role played by the civil society as well as the international 
organisations in the conflicts. Chapter 6 sums up and reflects on the use of child soldiers 
and their relative absence in others, way forward and gives recommendations. 
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Chapter Two 
Historical Overview 
Introduction 
The use of child soldiers in armed conflict is as old as humanity. The history of child 
soldiers dates back many centuries although it has been portrayed as a current 
phenomenon. The term “infantry” alludes to the use of young people to fight in combat, 
and were viewed through romantic notions of heroism. During the age of sail, young boys 
served on ships of war as “powder monkeys” tasked with running gunpowder and shot 
from the magazines to gun crews during naval engagements.
50
 Children have proved to be 
useful in war as far back as the 17
th
 century though they were not considered as true 
combatants in those days. Child soldiers were used to arm and maintain the knights of 
medieval Europe as well as carrying ammunition to cannon crews. At that time, they were 
not considered as true combatants or legitimate targets though they were part and parcel of 
armies. However, the most known and early use of "child soldiers" occurred during the 
1212 Children's Crusade. This was a march of thousands of unarmed boys from Northern 
France and Western Germany who thought they might take back the Holy Land by the 
sheer power of their faith although many never left Europe.
51
 It needs to be noted that the 
majority of those who marched perished from disease and hunger, while some were sold as 
slaves by unscrupulous ship captains. 
 
Since then children under the age of 15 have been present in war. In the American civil war 
which was referred as “a boys’ war”, it is believed that about 250,000-420,000 boys in 
their teens served in the Union and confederate armies and celebrated doing so.
52
 In the 
past century, children have been used in the two world wars and more recently in the Cold 
War. They have also been used in the Israel-Palestine conflict as suicide bombers.
53
 In 
Afghanistan, they have fought against Russian soldiers in 1980s as part of insurgent force. 
In more recent times the Taliban in Afghanistan has recruited about 8,000 children into its 
ranks.
54
 In the last 10 years or so it is believed that children have served as soldiers on 
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every continent apart from the Antarctica, with the largest numbers of them in Africa and 
Asia. Moreover, an additional half-million children serve in armed forces that are not now 
at war. Singer observed that the average age of child soldiers in two recent studies 
conducted  in Southeast Asia and in Central Africa was just under 13 while the youngest 
recorded child soldier was an armed 5-year old in Uganda.
55
 
 
Added to this increased issue is the growth in volume of the usage of child soldiers as it is 
believed that between 1988 and 2002 the number of child soldiers grew from 200,000 to 
300,000 in about twenty countries.
56
 However, this approximation seems currently 
outdated and underestimated in regards to the gravity of the issue as some evidence since 
2002 suggest an extreme use of child soldiers in new wars.
57
 As is seen, the plethora of 
protocols and agreements to protect the use of child soldiers has been ignored since the end 
of Cold War. It is tempting therefore, to assume that this increase in the use of child 
soldiers is as a result of failure of state control, and that only rebel forces recruit and use 
child soldiers and not states. However, the 2012 Global Report “Louder than words: An 
agenda for action to end state use of child soldiers” shows that child soldiers have been 
used in armed conflicts by 20 states since 2010, and that children are at risk of military use 
in many more states.
58
 Some of the states that have used child soldiers are Chad, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Libya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Central 
African Republic, Eritrea, and Rwanda. Moreover, a study by the Ford Institute for Human 
Security at the University of Pittsburgh concludes that in most cases government and rebel 
forces recruited the same ratio of child soldiers, except in Uganda mid 1990s where rebel 
forces with the support from the government of Sudan recruited disproportionately more 
children and in Mozambique where the opposite was the case.
59
 The evidence is more 
ambiguous in African cases. For example, in the Liberian conflict more child soldiers were 
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used by the rebels as compared to the state as well as in the Sudanese civil war of 1993-
2002. 
Why children have been used in Armed Conflicts in Africa 
Since 1975, the problem of child soldiering has become an epidemic in Africa providing 
both the largest concentration of conflicts and child soldiers. Children do not start war 
neither do they understand their complex causes. Yet many children in the world today are 
growing up in families and communities in armed conflict. The changing nature of 
conflicts from interstate to civil wars dictates that the community, the spaces where 
childhood is lived and experienced, becomes the battleground.
60
 Further, Africa has 
experienced the fastest growth in the use of child soldiers in recent years
61
 with even the 
average age declining further from teens to as low as nine or ten.
62
 Singer has provided a 
number of possible explanations for the increase of child soldiers. The arguments point to 
the structural features that contribute to the global growth and include high levels of 
poverty, rising orphan rates and the proliferation of small arms which are lighter to carry 
and easy to operate among others.
63
 However, these do not help in explaining the 
significant variation in the use of child soldiers in different countries. 
 
Poverty Levels 
According to research by intergovernmental organisations, activists and academics, 
poverty has been identified as the main factor in trying to explain the participation of child 
soldiers in conflicts in Africa (studies conducted by the Ford Institute for Human Security 
at the University of Pittsburgh, UNICEF, Human Rights Watch, the Swedish Save the 
Children Organization and the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers). For example, 
rich countries generally do not use child soldiers in armed conflict as compared to poor 
countries. Moreover, many former child soldiers have given poverty as the reason for 
joining conflict when interviewed.
64
 The correlation lies in the fact that armed conflicts 
lead to food shortage and in some extreme cases may lead to famine. Most people suffer 
and poverty rates increase although a minority may benefit financially because of the war. 
The lack of food and destruction of the means of production and infrastructure of a country 
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may also force families to volunteer their children to join the conflict either on the side of 
the government or the rebels. As both parties participate in the looting of the locals, the 
children may benefit themselves and consequently support their families. In this case, the 
children become the breadwinners of their families. Collier and Hoeffler claim that it is 
easier to maintain a rebellion in poor countries than in richer countries.
65
 Moreover, 
because of greed of the armed forces they may end up looting unarmed civilians and may 
avoid engaging each other.
66
 
 
Singer and the Quaker United Nations Office (QUNO) disagree with Collier and Hoeffler’s 
argument based on the fact that when today’s rich countries were poor, did not extensively 
use child soldiers. Moreover, many more poor children in war zone do not become child 
soldiers. Therefore, poverty they agree is not the main cause of children joining armed 
conflict. What is true evident is that those who are from well to do families and not living 
in poverty, rarely become child soldiers
67
 According to De Silva, Hobbs and Hanks, the 
poor have no voice and are not exposed in the same way to the arguments about the pros 
and cons of fighting in the armed forces. The children from more privileged backgrounds 
are less vulnerable to propaganda and live in a more protected environment. Many would 
have been removed from the conflict, perhaps to study outside of the country.
68
 In a study 
of 19 former child soldiers by de Silva, Hobbs and Hanks (2001),
69
 this was corroborated. 
 
Orphan Rates 
Children who are from disrupted family backgrounds, who have lost parents and family, 
and those from weakened bonds with family members become very vulnerable to 
recruitment.
70
 According to Human Right Watch, orphans and refugees are identified as 
more vulnerable to recruitment than the other disadvantaged groups.
71
 Children without 
parents lack parental guidance or care, and are easily attracted to the war incentives or 
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being threatened to join. They may be lured by the promise of food, protection or glory, or 
coerced by the threat of punishment or death. If they are guaranteed that this is the only 
way to have regular meals, clothing or medical attention, they may end up joining any 
group that promises them that.
72
 Apart from being abducted, some orphans have joined 
armed groups in search of protection and a sense of belonging. The high problem of high 
orphan rates in Africa is further exacerbated by the issue of HIV/Aids which have caused 
the death of many people leaving more children as orphans. 
 
Availability of Small Arms 
The proliferation of small arms has necessitated the increase of more children joining 
armed conflicts mainly after the end of the Cold War. The technological improvements that 
have also made the firearms lighter and easier to use have attracted more children to join 
armed conflict. The link between adulthood and the ability to bear arms no longer exists. 
Small arms like AK47 and its ammunition are not very expensive and can be operated 
easily by a 10 year old. Modern weapons for the infantry are easy to use and operate even 
in poor conditions. This ease of arming children, coupled with the drugs, alcohol, and 
magical potions given to children by military leaders, convert these children into ruthless 
combatants.
73
 
 
Access to Refugee and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) Camps 
Children constitute about 57 per cent of the inhabitants of refugee camps in Africa 
according to United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) report.
74
 Access 
to refugee and IDP camps by both government and rebel groups may provide an 
explanation for children recruitment. If children are faced with poverty in the camps or are 
orphaned, they may easily be lured by the belligerents’ parties to join the conflict. Children 
amassed in large groups become easy target for armed groups looking for recruits if they 
are not properly manned and protected. Armed groups can easily raid the camp to abduct 
the children. Furthermore, they can join through forced conscription or on voluntary basis. 
The camps need to be protected under the International Law and must be off limits to the 
belligerents. According to UNHCR, armed factions infiltrate camps to recruit occupants 
mainly children through the use of coercion or propaganda referred as “refugee 
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manipulation and militari ation” whereby about 15 per cent of refugees end up in refugee 
militarization.
75
 Therefore, due to lack of physical protection, rebel groups and government 
militias can conduct camp militarization which may result in high number of child soldiers. 
More, children will be recruited more to become soldiers of belligerent forces if camps are 
vulnerable to raids. 
 
Demand and Supply 
Children can be recruited simply to add strength due to lack of man power. Brocklehurst 
observes that children may be needed simply in the absence of available adult combatants 
or because they offer another valuable capacity.
76
 As soldiers, children can be cheap and 
efficient compared to adults. Moreover, children are less demanding and more obedient. 
Young soldiers are more likely to obey orders and fear their superiors which make them 
easier to control. On the other hand, children may be relied upon as they are skilful and full 
of energy which may enable them to carry out more challenging tasks. Conversely, the 
roles of children may be based on qualities of weakness or their presumed innocence. They 
may be easily used due to their lack of mental development as well as being easily 
manipulated through fear or drugs and forced to commit atrocities that adults cannot do. 
Moreover, it needs to be noted that the demand for child soldiers has also been necessitated 
by the availability of light weapons as discussed above. These weapons increase the ability 
of the armed group to substitute adult labour with child labour.
77
 
 
The ease with which children may be recruited by force constitutes the supply side. This is 
also possible due to the high unemployment rates or lack of educational opportunities of 
children in many conflict zones in Africa. Excess demand in conflict may be addressed 
through forced recruitment. Recruitment patterns will be dictated when supply and demand 
reach equilibrium. This may happen due to the nature of the war being fought. If there is 
direct competition among armed groups, adults will be favoured over children.
78
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Voluntary Recruitment 
In some cases children join armed groups without being forced to do so and may actually 
look for military groups themselves to offer their services. According to the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO) study, 64% of DRC, Burundi, Rwanda and Congo children 
joined different armed groups voluntarily.
79
  However, this requires some level of 
motivation. The level of motivation can be affected by poverty, grievance in term of social 
and economic injustice, and a vision of affecting change in the long run plus greed and 
survival.
80
 Thus, it can be disputed as to when it is driven by these factors enlistment is 
truly voluntary. 
 
The concept of ‘grievance’ is usually based on the logic of relative poverty and inequality. 
According to Gurr, most traditional works on inequality and conflict relate to the theory of 
relative deprivation.
81
 This premise suggests that while absolute poverty may lead to 
apathy and inactivity, comparisons with others in the same society who do better can lead 
to frustration and antagonism which again may result in violence to redress inequality. The 
end result can be grievance-induced discontent due to a group’s marginali ation as a 
determinant of mobilization for violent political struggle. 
 
Conflict fought between groups based on cultural inequalities may facilitate recruitment 
and mobilization for armed conflict. However, grievance as motivation for joining a 
rebellion works in the same manner for both children and adults.
82
 Children tend to equate 
violence with power and the reasons given for enlistment include not only peer pressure 
and an opportunity to engage in looting, but also political commitment and ethnic 
loyalties.
83
 For example, if a child belongs to a region or group which is relatively 
economically deprived, this may lead to frustration and a sense of unfairness which could 
influence the child to join an armed group of his choice to fight the injustice and try to 
change the status quo. In the same way, ideological propaganda and social pressure can 
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also persuade children to enroll with armed groups.
84
 Then, children’s decision to join 
armed conflict may also be influenced by issues of ideology, nationalism and identity.
85
 
 
According to UNICEF; power, glamour, and excitement also figure in children's decisions 
to join armed groups. For those growing up in abject poverty, the gun and the military 
uniform confer a measure of power and prestige that they could not have obtained through 
other means.
86
 The excitement of possessing a gun and participating in military activities 
offer opportunities and makes them feel big. Children also join after being failed by the 
political, social, and economic system. What needs to be realised therefore, is that youth 
are not passive pawns in armed conflict but are actors who find meaning and identity in 
what they see as the struggle for justice.  Finding meaning in life is a powerful incentive 
for everyone, but it is a particularly strong motive for teenagers, who are at a stage in their 
lives when they are trying out different identities and deciding on their role and place in 
society.
87
  
 
How Child Soldiers have been utilised 
According to Nagle, some children have been coerced into armed conflict after being 
brainwashed or drugged by the belligerents while some are forced at gunpoint or through 
extreme violence to take up arms.
88
  In other circumstances they are kidnapped, trafficked, 
sold to armed groups and forced to fight. Some of the children are the offspring of fighters, 
born into conflict and the only thing they know is war. Some children are used as battle 
shields or force to walk into mine fields to clear paths for the older combatants to pass. 
Other children are unknowingly used as suicide bombers while others like female child 
soldiers are forced into the ranks to be “comfort women” attending to the personal needs 
and sexual proclivities of commanders and male combatants. These children participate in 
the worst acts, and many commit unspeakable atrocities and fail to understand the gravity 
of their actions because they are young.
89
 Moreover, as part of the indoctrination and 
control process of the child soldiers, they have been forced to inflict untold suffering, and 
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to kill their own fellow recruits as well as family members. This conditioning process 
prevents the children from escaping or to return home. On the other hand, it creates strong 
emotional, dependent relationships between them and their commanders.
90
 
 
The Absence of Child Soldiers in Conflicts or Variations 
Armed groups exhibit different patterns in their interactions with civilian populations. 
These patterns range from ethnic cleansing, abduction of children, amputation, rape and 
many others. Conversely, some armed groups have perpetrated very low levels of violence 
and shown restraint in their relationship with non-combatants. For example, armies in Sri 
Lanka and Colombia put in place measures to check civilian abuse committed by their 
soldiers.
91
 This is against the back ground that civilian population forms the bedrock of the 
rebel group as they depend on them for support and in terms of labour and resources. They 
may undermine the very base of support to operate effectively if coercive tactics are used 
on the civilian population. This coercive behaviour may include forced extraction of food, 
labour and killing of civilians. 
 
Fighting units and their combatants are faced with the issue of how to deal with combatant-
civilians relations as they seek to extract resources from the civilians. In this case, the 
likelihood of abuse will depend on whether sufficient resources are available for the armed 
faction to exercise restraint in anticipation of future rewards. However, this may further 
depend on whether the territory has weak control or poor internal cohesion. These may 
prevent armed groups from acting on these incentives. If armed groups are fighting for 
control of the territory, they may refrain from acts of abuse. However, the abusive manner 
of fighting units can further be predicted by their characteristic. If it is comprised of 
members with different agendas, is ethnically heterogeneous and lacks discipline, it may 
end up treating civilians with abuse and coercion. In contrast, if the unit shares common 
goals, have disciplinary measures in place and it is homogenous, it will likely be less 
abusive to civilians and their relationship will be cordial.
92
 These characteristics of armed 
groups are very important in determining how civilians are going to be treated. If an 
optimal level of interaction is to be obtained from the civilian population; Bates, Greif and 
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Singh notes that the armed group should avoid extracting too much or risk killing the goose 
that lays the golden egg.
93
 This is because too much violence might force the civilians to 
flee and the group’s ability may be undermined and may fail to obtain support. On the 
other hand, Azam argues that warlords have particular incentives to wreak havoc in their 
own communities. By making it costly for civilians to produce, it becomes more attractive 
for them to join the warlord’s armed group as combatants.94 In this case, the abuse of one’s 
own community depresses the wages that have to be paid to the fighters. 
 
Armed groups may also need to act positively in dealing with the civilians by providing for 
the needs of the community. They may further exercise restraint in the use of violence 
against civilians in order to have support from the population. Arriving at this cooperative 
arrangement with civilians can be very difficult for them to reach the point of providing 
support for the belligerents and the combatants not abusing the civilians.
95
 Armed groups 
avoid recruiting soldiers in contested areas due to fear that the recruits may end up 
defecting to the other side. It further needs to be noted that low levels of violence are often 
observed in contested areas in order to win the hearts and minds of the populace. This is 
because any group does not want to be seen as the one causing violence as may lose 
support of the people. 
 
The frequency of using child soldiers and using other forms of violence varies across 
conflicts, armed groups within conflict and units within armed groups. A particular group 
may have in its repertoire of violence such things as kidnapping, assassination, torture, 
sexual violence and recruiting children. It is important to note that the absence of child 
soldiers by a particular armed group in a conflict might reflect our ignorance of its actual 
occurrence rather than a true absence. There may be a number of reasons that using child 
soldiers and other forms of violence are underreported in wartime.
96
 The conditions that 
may promote the reporting on the use of child soldiers depends on resource availability to 
groups monitoring the use of children in conflict like UNICEF, Save the Children Fund, 
the Coalition to Stop the Use of Children in Conflict and many others. 
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The non-use of child soldiers in armed conflict can depend on leadership and the norms 
followed by the group.  Group leaders or commanders may judge that using child soldiers 
would be counterproductive or it is against the norms of the group. The ability to enforce 
this choice depends on how strong the command element is, whether information regarding 
the malpractice is known by the command and if the group’s hierarchy is able to punish 
subordinates for the infraction. Moreover, the observed repertoire of violence by the 
combatants may depend on their own norms concerning violence against civilians. This 
may be those the recruits enter the group with, those produced in the course of the 
socialization of initial induction into the group, those produced by powerful wartime small-
group processes, or those selectively reinforced by the hierarchy.
97
 However, this may 
change over time due to the interaction with civilians or other armed group. For example, a 
group may add a particular form of violence in response to another group’s action. This can 
be a strategic decision by the command or individual units to march the observed. If 
civilians resist the group’s rule, an armed group may turn more punitive on command due 
to frustration. 
 
According to Huntington, in regards to leadership strategy, military leaders need to control 
violence on civilians by the men under their command, as well as its targeting. 
Commanders should not fear that the soldiers may turn against them.
98
 Commanders 
should not only be concerned about issues of military tactics and strategy but also on issues 
of recruits, intelligence, and other necessary “inputs” to the war effort, and if the war effort 
is legitimate in the eyes of domestic and international observers.
99
 Military leaders play an 
important role in the prohibition and promotion of different types of violence against 
civilians. As armed groups are hierarchical, control of violence and decisions need to be 
enforced through the chain of command although this will depend on the strength of the 
military hierarchy. The ability of the hierarchy to enforce decisions concerning patterns of 
violence thus depends on the flow of information concerning those patterns up the chain of 
command and the willingness of superiors to hold those below them accountable through 
punishment.
100
 If military commanders are seen as legitimate authorities, then obedience 
will be greatly enhanced. In regards to individual combatants, it will depend on their 
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cultural norms and beliefs in regards to violence. Some armed groups may recruit from 
criminal populations. This will reflect the group’s resource base. Whether recruits enter an 
armed group with relatively homogeneous norms and beliefs depend on the recruiting 
practices of the group. 
 
According to Weinstein, armed groups with economic benefits attract opportunistic recruits 
who will be more likely to wield violence indiscriminately for their private interest while 
those with social endowments draw activist recruits willing to make commitments to group 
goals over long time horizons.
101
 Such groups insist on extensive indoctrination, training 
and socialization practices in melding child recruits into group members. Therefore, 
patterns of violence reflect group strategy concerning training, discipline, and incentives 
and group ideology rather than distinct pools of recruits.
102
 If the armed group relies on 
child recruits, training and socialization likely play a more important role than time 
horizons. 
 
Implications  
The above analysis is applicable to all forms of violence including using child soldiers in 
armed conflicts. This can be applied top-down or bottom-up as I explain below. 
 
The Top-Down Implication 
 If commanders of an armed group are strong and consider using child soldiers to be 
counterproductive to their mission and interests, very few child soldiers will be used in 
armed conflict. The men under their command will be restrained in recruiting and using 
child soldiers. Commanders will prohibit use of child soldiers for fear of the consequences 
of using them as it is illegal by international law. If an armed group is strongly dependent 
on civilians for logistical support and intelligence, it may be restrained to victimise the 
same people it depends on. They might, however, recruit from other area and avoid 
terrorising their future constituency it plans to govern.  In conflicts where one party 
engages in massive violence against civilians, the other party may practice restraint as a 
way to demonstrate moral superiority. As said above, it can be prohibited out of deference 
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to international law for various reasons, perhaps because they aspire to some sort of 
international recognition or because they fear financial backers may disapprove.
103
 
 
The Bottom-Up implication  
Wood observed that if commanders prohibit recruiting and using child soldiers (or if they 
promote it but the hierarchy is too weak to enforce that policy) and if individual 
combatants and their units endorse norms against using child soldiers, few children will be 
recruited and used. Such norms may take the form of internalized cultural norms or group 
codes of conduct whereby non-combatants are viewed as beyond the circle of legitimate 
violence.
104
 This can be due to the fact that the armed group positions itself among its 
members as a liberating rather than an occupying or punishing force. This norm may 
originate with the leadership. However, the issue is whether these have been internalized as 
norms by individual combatants and the wartime processes of brutalization, 
desensitization, and dehumanization must not have eroded such normative constraints. The 
norm must be endorsed by all combatants, and enforced against the few who attempt to 
transgress it. If the command is weak, individuals and independent units will indulge in 
abusing civilians and using child soldiers. Therefore, the ability of the hierarchy to enforce 
decisions taken by the leadership is central in compliance of the norm in regards to using 
child soldiers.  
 
Extent of the Problem of Child soldiers in Africa 
It is undisputed fact that children have been used in African armed conflicts and as such 
have made contribution to the political end state in a number of wars. Even today children 
are being used in the Democratic Republic of Congo as well as in Northern Uganda. The 
problem of child soldiering is wide spread and the numbers are hard to find. The turmoil 
and destruction caused by war makes it difficult to keep accurate records of children 
involved in the conflict. This is a huge problem in Africa due to poor records keeping and 
the absence of birth records. Moreover, many armed groups including governments do not 
keep records or document the ages of the children they recruit. Many children avoid 
revealing their age for fear of rejection by their communities and retribution by their 
former commanders as well from those they once attacked. However, in the mid-1990s it 
was estimated that about quarter of a million child soldiers were demobilized.
105
 Further, 
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the Machel Study showed that in some countries, children constitute a significant 
percentage of the combatants.
106
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Chapter Three 
Angola, Mozambique and Child Soldiers: An Analysis 
 
Introduction  
Angola and Mozambique have been chosen as the case studies for this study. By placing 
the Angolan and Mozambican civil wars in focus, I seek to explore why child soldiers were 
used and why there were variations. Taking into account global and regional trends as well 
as the developments in Angola and Mozambique, the period between 1975 and 1994 
represent a distinguishable phase in both countries. 
 
Politically, Angola and Mozambique have a common colonial history that determined the 
violent nature of their independence and further similarities is found in their post 
independence period. Apart from both being Portuguese colonies, they became 
independent in 1975. Mozambique became independent in June and Angola in November. 
Both countries declared themselves officially socialist, and a Marxist-Leninist model of 
development was embarked on as early as 1977.
107
 Angola and Mozambique experienced 
civil wars at almost the same time 1975-1994 and 1976-1992 soon after independence 
respectively which was characterised by external interference and significantly influenced 
by Cold War politics.  
 
According to Minter, “Angola and Mo ambique feature a complex interplay of internal, 
regional and global factors that refuse to fit simple models of wars between states or of 
purely internal civil wars.”108 As indicated earlier, the wars followed the wars of 
independence and the movements coming to power considered their history the same as 
that of creating a nation and their opponents as foreign enemies or traitors though these 
images were based on myth and propaganda. However, large numbers of politically 
conscious Angolans and Mozambicans believed them. The Popular Movement for the 
Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in Angola aimed consciously and successfully at national 
support while Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) in Mozambique was the 
undisputed leader of the independence struggle. On the other hand, the National Union for 
the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) claimed to represent predominantly the people 
of southern and central Angola. The Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) was an 
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externally organized and ethnically based group based in the North and Central of 
Mozambique.
109
 Both UNITA and RENAMO claimed to be exclusively representing black 
people, more deeply rooted in rural African culture, and consequently more genuine 
African nationalists.
110
 
 
In both cases, state and non-state actors both played active roles. The wars lasted more than 
15 years in both cases; 16 for Mozambique and 20 for Angola. Moreover, both countries 
were campaigning to get rid of white minority rule in Africa. Further, in Angola 8000 child 
soldiers were used out of 194,000 combatants representing 4% while in Mozambique 
24,498 child soldiers were used out of 92,489 combatants representing 28%.
111
 
Furthermore, both countries are in Southern Africa and the rebel movements were both 
supported by South Africa. 
 
Angolan Civil War: 1975-1994 
The origins of the Angola civil war dates back to the colonial era especially in 1961. More 
than 100,000 people were killed as a result of the war. This included the decolonisation 
conflict and the Angolan War of independence from 1961 to 1974. The civil war lasted 27 
years, from independence from Portugal in 1975 to the death of National Union for the 
Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) leader Jonas Savimbi in 2002.
112
 A number of 
actors were involved in the war which served as a surrogate battle ground for the Cold 
War. A Marxist (communist) government born of a liberation movement, Popular 
Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), led by Agostinho Neto (a poet) was 
supported by the Soviet Union and Cuba. The other two movements, the National Front for 
the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and UNITA (anti communist), were being supported by 
their colonial masters Portugal, apartheid South Africa, the United States and Zaire under 
Mobutu Sese Seko. 
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It needs to be noted that when Angola got independence, a civil war was already being 
fought involving the three movements mentioned above. Apart from signing the Alvor 
Accords in January 1975, which called for a transition government and elections leading to 
independence in November of the same year, power sharing models were not discussed to 
guide the movements after independence. More effort was put on positioning their military 
wings for possible takeover of Luanda rather than on implementing the provisions of the 
Alvor Accords. The general perception among the parties was that the one who would 
control Luanda the capital city on 11
th
 November, 1975 would control Angola. Apart from 
UNITA, the MPLA and FNLA were mainly attracted by a military solution to the conflict 
rather than a peaceful and political one. On Independence Day, Luanda was controlled by 
the MPLA while being under attack by the FNLA and UNITA. This battle for Luanda led 
to the defeat of the FNLA and as such only UNITA remained as main opponent to 
MPLA.
113
  
 
The MPLA emerged as the ruling party of independent Angola by March 1976 while the 
FNLA faded in importance. UNITA under the leadership of Jonas Savimbi was then being 
supported by South Africa and other countries. Angola on the other hand supported 
guerrillas who were fighting for independence in South West Africa (Namibia) from 
apartheid South Africa, while soldiers from South Africa who were based in Namibia 
joined UNITA. Later, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) openly joined South Africa in 
supporting UNITA in the 1980s.
114
 After the withdrawal of the Cuban and South African 
troops after the 1988 agreements on the independence of Namibia, UNITA and Angolan 
government signed a ceasefire agreement in May 1991 which led to MPLA winning 
elections the following year deemed free and fair by the international observers. However, 
Savimbi rejected the results and ordered his troops to return to war, reigniting full scale 
conflict supported by South Africa and Zaire.  
 
Both parties in Angola civil war came to understand the significance of young people in 
the conflict and in the maintenance of power. This realization paved the way for the forced 
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recruitment of young people and children to increase their fighting strength and ensure that 
a section of the Angolan society supported them with loyalty.
115
 
  
Mozambican Civil War: 1976-1992 
Mozambique became independent on 25
th
 June 1975 after ten years of military struggle 
against Portuguese colonial domination.
116
 Three political movements were involved in the 
struggle for independence. The National Democratic Union of Mozambique (UDENAMO) 
founded by Mozambique migrants in Rhodesia in 1960, the Mozambique African National 
Union (MANU) formed in Kenya in 1961 and the National Union for Mozambican 
Independence (UNAMI) formed in Blantyre, Malawi. After Mozambican independence, 
the three movements relocated to Tanzania and formed one united front under the influence 
of President Julius Nyerere in 1962. The new organisation became to be known as the 
Mozambican Liberation Front (FRELIMO) and was under the leadership of Dr Eduardo 
Mondlane. The organisation was dismantled later in 1962 due to different political 
orientation for the front, race issues, ethnic and personal conflict with Dr Mondlane. These 
reasons led to the formation of other groups and ended up opposing FRELIMO in the post 
conflict era. 
 
Following a coup d’état in Portugal in April 1 7 , the leader of the post-coup General 
Antonio de Spinola wanted to hand over power to the colonies through a democratic 
process. However, FRELIMO leadership opposed the move of handing over power through 
democratic process, arguing that as a party it represented the will of the people and 
therefore Portugal should hand over power to them. FRELIMO insisted that as the “sole 
legitimate representative of the Mo ambican people,”117 it should take over directly 
without any elections. Portugal gave up its instance on elections and handed over power to 
FRELIMO after General Spinola was outmanoeuvred by Major Melo Antunes and after 
conducting secret talks with them.
118
 Following this development, leaders of other political 
parties were jailed and some sent to concentration camps known as re-education camps. 
RENAMO was then born after two commanders Andre Matadi Matsangaise and Alfonso 
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Marceto Dhlakama escaped from the re-education camps to Rhodesia where they got 
military support from the Rhodesia army to fight FRELIMO. 
 
After independence Mozambique experienced civil war, between the government 
FRELIMO and the armed opposition group RENAMO. The war lasted 16 years. The civil 
war costed the country US$15 billion and as many as one million people were killed.
119
 
Because of the duration of the conflict, millions of children and youth grew up knowing 
only the horrors of war.  According to Leão, a big number of youth and children of both 
sexes joined either the government forces or the opposition armed group and became active 
willing participants of the conflict while others were pressed to join, by ideological 
brainwashing or by economic conditions.
120
 Many more children were abducted, forced to 
kill and torture both friends and family in order to ensure a total disconnection from the 
community. 
 
Factors that led to the use of Child Soldiers in Angola and Mozambique Civil Wars 
According to conventional wisdom, guerrilla warfare requires popular support. The 
guerrilla force must rely on political support and political commitment unlike the state that 
depends on the army, police and the resources under its disposal to sustain the war effort. 
However, this was not the case in Mozambique and Angola as the states were weaker 
compared to the insurgents due to the external support rendered to RENAMO and UNITA 
respectively.  
 
Angola 
There is no official figure of how many child soldiers were used by UNITA and the 
Angolan government during the civil war. However, as children made up more than half of 
the population, they provided a fertile resource to the armies and, with few opportunities 
available to them in terms of formal education and jobs, they were easily mobilised and 
incorporated into the dynamics of the war.
121
 According to the Coalition to Stop the Use of 
Child Soldiers, it is estimated that about 7,000 children served with UNITA and 
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government forces.
122
 Child protection workers in Angola put the figure at about 11,000 
from the two sides that lived and worked in combat zones. Different roles were given to the 
children depending on their size.  Children who were physically developed were active in 
the fighting while those who were smaller acted as porters, cooks, spies and food gatherers. 
Children were even tasked with the dangerous duty of running messages to and from the 
front. It is important to note that UNITA had a strict command structure. Both boys and 
girls were punished for infraction of rules. Children were whipped by the soldiers for not 
following orders and some were forced to carry heavy loads. Others were sent to collect 
firewood and food in government held areas. 
 
Child soldiers were also used by the government of Angola during the war despite national 
legislation that prohibited their conscription although they were fewer in number in 
comparison to UNITA.
123
 Many of these children were rounded up and forced to join the 
government side during recruitment drives in areas they held. During the roundups, many 
children could not prove their true age because of lack of proper identification like birth 
certificates. This usually happened in poor areas and mainly targeted the unemployed 
youth. Some boys received arms training and fought in the front lines. Others worked as 
radio operators and mechanical repairmen. Although the smaller ones were released by the 
soldiers and others bribed their way out, usually those who looked strong were recruited.  
 
Why children were used in Angola 
Many of the children taken to become soldiers in Angola were victims of conscription 
practices. The reluctance of the majority of Angolan people to fight in the war pushed the 
government to take anyone they could find including children to fight. Some of the 
children were press ganged or kidnapped, while others were forced to join to defend their 
families and country. 
 
The move by UNITA in 1977 to expand its military from a guerrilla army to one with semi 
regular and regular forces led to the recruitment and use of child soldiers. Savimbi termed 
this “the theory of large numbers”.124 This was a strategy whereby local commanders 
received orders from above to abduct from government controlled territories when they 
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failed to meet their quotas for recruits. Those captured were taken on foot to bases in the 
bush and those of military age were then sent to Jamba for training. This shows that 
sometimes UNITA observed the minimum age limit of recruitment. It needs to be noted 
that UNITA previously avoided forced recruitment of children. Children were only drafted 
when of a certain age or maturity. UNITA’s approach to civilians before 1 72 was based 
on political persuasion and social pressure. It made systematic contacts with the local 
leadership and with young educated Umbundu as well as conservative whites using 
nationalistic and ethno-regional appeals. However, this changed over the 1990s as it 
became increasingly divorced from the populace who supported it and therefore resorted to 
the use of coercion and intimidation. UNITA officially denied having abducted children 
claiming that they were taken either when they wanted to join, were separated from parents 
or when the parents had died.
125
 
 
On the part of the children, though forcibly recruited, the rewards of military life provided 
some positive incentive. By joining the armed groups they would have prospects of 
independence from family. Moreover, by being in possession of a gun they would have 
access to food, loot and women. This applied to Mozambique as well. Other opportunities 
for advancement in the army also existed like overseas training in Morocco and other 
countries as well as civilian scholarships in Portugal. As such, military service was an 
opportunity as well as a political obligation although these rewards were limited within 
RENAMO in Mozambique. However, those deployed on the borders of South Africa or 
Malawi profited from sale of looted goods across the borders while those who were being 
trained in South Africa got monthly salaries.
126
 
 
How Children were recruited in Angola 
There were mixed pattern of recruitment in Angola although it was less prominent than in 
Mozambique. According to Minter, those who joined in 1974-1976 did so voluntarily 
because they considered UNITA as the natural movement for their Umbundu region and 
for ethnically diverse Moxico province. The rest who followed were mostly recruited by 
force or were being abducted from areas which were under the control of government.
127
 It 
is said that they “joined UNITA because of ...an emotional attachment to kinship, tribe and 
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the Angolan south, and an almost mystical allegiance to UNITA’s charismatic guerrilla 
leader”.128 Some youth also joined the MPLA during this period. 
 
Evidence of forced recruitment also appeared and it was wide spread in 1980s. Child 
soldiers describing their abduction by soldiers used words as ataque (attack) or raptado 
(kidnap). Others claim they were taken (levados) from school or their villages. Some 
evidence also point to the fact that some of those recruited were of military age meaning 
that they were above 18 years. The trend therefore seems to be that of predominantly 
voluntary recruitment at the start of the war changing to forced recruitment as the war 
progressed. This could be due to war fatigue and the need to increase bayonet strength for 
conventional warfare on both sides. 
 
Not all enlistment was due to forced conscription, some said they joined UNITA to fight 
for political reasons after being frustrated with the situation they found themselves in. This 
could be due to political motivation under UNITA education and propaganda. It may also 
be linked to feelings of grievances against the government for lack of opportunities like 
education and jobs as well as the culture of violence and displacement. Many of the 
children had never experienced peace since they were born. Some had witnessed relatives 
being killed by government troops or police, UNITA or by the Cubans.
129
 
 
Mozambique 
In regards to the Mozambican war, documentation has shown that RENAMO recruited 
young boys into its rank as well as girls as personal servants and later would become wives 
providing sexual services. On the other hand, the government of Mozambique forcefully 
recruited unemployed urban youth between the ages of 14 to 16 years into its rank.
130
 
International agencies have concluded that the use of children in combat and transportation 
of goods was done more by RENAMO than the government of FRELIMO. Though 
RENAMO leadership initially refused to recruit and use child soldiers, it later reversed this 
policy. Therefore, this section will focus more on the factors that led to the use of child 
soldiers by RENAMO than FRELIMO. 
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Why children were used in Mozambique 
Children were used in the Mozambican civil war by both the government and RENAMO. 
The government’s use can be attributed to FRELIMO’s policy on education. Under 
Marxist-Leninism, FRELIMO nationalized children under the age of six. Further, under 
President Samora Machel, FRELIMO sent children of about twelve years to Cuba and East 
Europe for social-political indoctrination and training. It is therefore believed that by 1980s 
there were more than 2,300 Mozambican children students in Cuba. 
 
RENAMO believed that adults were not good fighters as compared to children and hence 
the consistent and systematic forced recruitment of children in its ranks. It preferred 
children because they were strong and had stamina, did not complain, could survive better 
in the bush and easily followed orders. They could easily be turned into fierce fighters 
through brutal indoctrination.
131
 To achieve this, RENAMO used to take the boy soldier 
back to his village to kill someone known to him. This was meant to close the door for the 
child to ever return to the village. These types of children ended up developing a dependent 
relationship with their captors and the group. The cumulative involvement of children in 
violence desensitizes them to suffering and makes them more likely to commit violent acts. 
This therefore shows that RENAMO preferred children to adult combatants. 
 
How Children were recruited in Mozambique 
The recruitment pattern in Mozambique was far more consistent than in Angola with 
forced recruitment more dominant. Those abducted or kidnapped were taken on foot to the 
Rhodesian border first and then by truck to Odzi which was a RENAMO training base in 
eastern Rhodesia.
132
 Some were taken to training bases inside Mozambique. After being 
captured they were forced to carry goods for the soldiers and some were used as guides in 
their home areas. Some were being abducted in their fields, at home or on their way to visit 
relatives while others got captured after attack on their town, villages or schools.  
 
Voluntary recruitment was present though not much. This was mainly at the beginning of 
the war when several chiefs voluntarily chose to support RENAMO. This resulted in the 
youth loyal and under their leadership joining the group. Some joined after being 
disillusioned by the government while others after being offered substantial payments by 
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South African intelligence agents. It was also seen that marginalised youth showed some 
voluntary adherence to RENAMO. This was as a result of economic marginalization due to 
the escalation of the war and the structural adjustment programmes which began in 1987.  
Later, recruits were mobilized in areas controlled by RENAMO. Nevertheless, capture or 
kidnapping was the norm even in central Mozambique where RENAMO had the greatest 
influence and control. Child captives were also used as soldiers in southern 
Mozambique.
133
 
 
Forced recruitment of children was widespread and the most common entry into RENAMO 
military ranks. The ages ranged from 12 up to 30 or 40. Those who were deemed too old or 
too young for combat were used as porterage, messengers or servants for officers. The use 
of children in combat differed significantly by region. More child soldiers were used in 
Maputo and Gaza provinces. Apart from forced recruitment or volunteering, other children 
were taken while looking for employment in Malawi by the whites to RENAMO. Other 
unemployed youths were recruited in Mozambique on the pretence of going to be offered 
employment or becoming illegal migrants in South Africa. 
 
FRELIMO conducted forced recruitment of young people perceived to be strong enough to 
fight. Students who were offered scholarships to study abroad ended up in military 
academies in the host countries while others were lured into special national programmes 
which turned out to conduct military training.
134
 If not recruited by FRELIMO, children 
were supposed to join the militia or other groups of civilians who possessed guns and 
underwent training conducted by the army. These youth were supposed to defend and 
secure their communities and villages against attack. The militias were part and parcel of 
the community and did not move to other areas to fight. They had to provide protection to 
the villages. Communities and villages became military targets as the line between 
civilians and soldiers was blurred because of this arrangement. 
 
Rebel agendas during the Civil Wars and Child Recruitment 
According to Thaler, the Marxist-Leninist ideology of FRELIMO and the MPLA led to 
their practice of restraint in violence against civilians, and that the loss of ideological 
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commitment over time led to a corresponding diminishment of restraint though they 
remained significantly less violent than their insurgent opponents when they suffered a 
breakdown of discipline.
135
 It is against this background therefore, that this section will 
focus on UNITA and RENAMO’s use of violence as a strategy of war and how it was 
determined as a group ideology. 
 
UNITA maintained tight control of the people in the area under its control. The civil 
population failed to enjoy greater freedoms and experienced threats, forced conscription, 
sexual services and arbitrary killings. Children were the frequent targets of brutal, 
indiscriminate acts of violence as they were beaten, raped, enslaved for sexual purposes, 
forced to work, murdered and some forced to become soldiers while women and girls 
became primary targets of sexual slavery,  rape and other forms of sexual violence.
136
 
Private property was frequently pillaged and homes burnt. Indiscriminate shelling, killing 
of government officials and traditional chiefs became the modus operandi of UNITA 
operations. This was done as a vicious expression of power over the individual, but also as 
a means of expressing dominance over the community at large. 
 
The strategy and tactics used by UNITA in Angola were mainly meant to raise the costs of 
foreign "occupation" through maximum disruption and dislocation, while minimizing its 
own casualties.
137
 UNITA infiltrated and contested new areas in order to wrestle power and 
control from the MPLA government. However, they rarely held or seized towns except in 
areas in the South which were near their base. Rather, economic strategic and military 
targets were sabotaged while government troops were frequently ambushed. Further, 
access was also obstructed by extensive use of mines along likely approaches to 
settlements, along lines of communication and on infrastructure sites. UNITA 
indiscriminately attacked and took hostage hundreds of expatriate technicians and advisers 
working in the country; and Savimbi repeatedly threatened multinational companies with 
retaliation for their support of the government. It is believed that this move was done to 
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strengthen UNITA's bargaining position in demanding direct negotiations with Luanda for 
the establishment of a government of national unity after Savimbi realised that it was 
difficult to win the war. 
 
In the Mozambican civil war a lot of civilians were targeted and more affected. It is 
believed that between 600,000 and one million people died as a result of the war.
138
 More 
evidence points to RENAMO for the use of the indiscriminate violence against civilians. 
This cannot be accounted fully by the dominant theories of civil war as it went beyond 
purely rational military logic. 
 
If violence is used selectively during a conflict, it can help in enforcing behavioural 
support for the group. However, the violence by RENAMO would appear to have filled the 
purpose of coercing the civilian population into compliance in some areas while in other 
areas, the violence was more indiscriminate. It can also be argued that the violence was 
meant to destabilise the country and the FRELIMO government. According to Hultman, 
“RENAMO had an overall objective of destabilisation: it wanted to weaken the 
government to force concessions from it and a change in the political system in 
Mo ambique”.139 Hultman acknowledges that this was a South African strategy aimed at 
dominating the region by avoiding combat with government military forces and giving 
more attention to destroying the economy, infrastructure and controlling the population.
140
 
Most attacks on civilians were on areas dominated by government supporters than under 
RENAMO control. In using strategic violence, it was able to establish and win support in 
the whole country while at the same time forcing the government to the negotiation table 
by the damage caused. Therefore, this was meant to hurt the government. 
 
This was in contrast to conventional wisdom as rebels in contested areas where they want 
to establish control and mobilise support, need to use selective violence or non-lethal forms 
of coercion on the civilians to secure compliance as compared to government-controlled 
areas and strongholds where indiscriminate violence may be used. When rebels are unable 
to defeat government forces through fighting, violence against civilians is used as an 
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alternative strategy to impose political and military costs on the government.
141
 Violence 
against civilians creates fear and chaos.
142
 This shows that the state is unable to hold power 
and protect its citizens it is supposed to protect. Therefore, instead of seeking the support 
of the people in the area it operated, RENAMO terrorised the population and thereby 
undermining government control in the process. 
 
Roles of Female Combatants 
The use of children in armed conflict is global in scope and defies gender boundaries. 
However, the issue has been portrayed much in scholarly and policy literature as a 
uniquely male phenomenon. It has failed to include gender perspectives on armed conflict. 
This has been largely informed by traditional perceptions of armed conflict as a 
phenomenon occurring between males—perceptions reinforced by popular media images 
of boys armed with AK47s—girls have frequently been deemed peripheral and rendered 
invisible within fighting forces. 
143
 However, girls are forced into military activities around 
the globe in many armed conflicts. For example, girls comprised about 25 percent of 
opposition forces in Angola and Mozambique civil wars.
144
 The Coalition to Stop the Use 
of Child Soldiers estimates that the different fighting forces in Angola abducted 30 000 
girls during the conflict, and that 16 000 under-18s were in the forces of the government 
and UNITA by 2002.
145
 However, government estimates vary but are lower than 16 000.  
 
According to Human Rights Watch, they were abducted or rounded up during sweeps 
through their villages and ended up serving with UNITA as domestics, assistants, and 
“wives” to soldiers. Women and girls were also forcibly given as “comfort women” to 
visiting guests in UNITA-held areas during the war.
146
 After being abducted, they were 
trained in a number of activities to support the armed groups and included pillaging 
techniques following an attack, loading and dismounting arms, defence techniques, 
accompanying male soldiers, sabotage, midwifery, welcoming, rousing, singing and 
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dancing during special events.
147
 Apart from sexual relations, some have been used in 
transporting military goods during withdraw when under attack. When UNITA troops were 
victorious after attack, the girls would dance with loud voice proclaiming victory. Sexual 
dances were also performed by girls to maintain male soldiers’ morale, and to ensure they 
remained awake and alert during critical times when enemy attack was imminent. It is 
believed that it was following such celebration that girls would be sexually abused and 
given out to commanders as rewards for their bravery. On the other hand, girls attached to 
commanders were tasked to carry things to the front to assist them. 
 
In the context of Mozambique war, girls joined the government forces of FRELIMO 
because of the appealing rhetoric and propaganda that promised new and emancipatory 
roles of women and young girls as well as for protection.
148
 Some joined RENAMO to run 
away from the harsh conditions of having to live without food and money, and the belief of 
a better future. In other cases, fighting forces and groups press ganged and abducted girls 
from discotheques and market places or enroute to school and market places. According to 
Devon, girls inevitably experienced feelings of insecurity and victimisation prior to their 
abduction.
149
 Females never advanced in authority and they remained subordinate to the 
males they were attached. Apart from being trained how to use a gun; women were used 
for cooking, cleaning and growing crops for the men. This was due to the fact that 
RENAMO encouraged gender division of labour.
150
 RENAMO exploited women as reward 
to combatants. They were raped and used as slave wives by the soldiers who had special 
rights to women and girls. On the other hand, RENAMO promised scholarships to study 
abroad to attract girls into its forces; while few if any scholarships were ever given.
151
 
Further, girls in the front lines in Angola and Mozambique conscripted, abducted and gang 
press other girls into the armed groups.
152
 
 
                                                          
147
 V. Stavrou. (2004). Breaking the Silence: Girls Abducted During Armed Conflict in Angola, Report for 
the Canadian International Development Agency. 
148
 S. McKay & D. Mazurana. (2004). Where Are the Girls? Girls in Fighting Forces in Northern Uganda, 
Sierra Leone, and Mozambique: Their Lives During and After War. International Centre for Human Rights 
and Democratic Development. Montreal. 
149
 Myriam Denov. (2008). Girl Soldiers and Human Rights: Lessons from Angola, Mozambique, Sierra 
Leone and Northern Uganda. The International Journal of Human Rights.12(5): 813-836. 
150
 Carol B. Thompson. (1999). Loc Cit. 
151
 Dyan E. Mazurana, susan A. McKay, Kristopher C. Carlson & Janel C. Kasper. (2002). Girls in Fighting 
Forces, and Groups: their Recruitment, Participation, Demobilisation, and Reintegration. Journal of Peace 
Psychology. 8(2): 97-123. 
152
 Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers. (2001). Op Cit. 
 
 
42 
 
The girls in both Angola and Mozambique experienced extreme forms of violence due to 
the formal and informal setup of the armed groups. The command structure (formal) of the 
armed groups carried their mission and tasks using threats, fear, violence and brutality. 
This was the same even at informal level as daily routines; informal values and inter-
actions were propagated and sustained through violence. The culture of violence became 
part and parcel therefore of every girl soldiers’ life and “ranged from along a continuum 
from verbal abuse to acts of cruelty and reflected the patriarchal power relations and 
gendered oppression inherent in the group”.153 Girls were subservient to male authority and 
suffered severely at the hands of those who commanded them. They lacked access to 
adequate food and health care as they lived in dire poverty. In addition to being 
combatants, their daily victimisation included sexual violence, forced marriages, threats, 
physical and psychological abuse, and child bearing and rearing among others. 
 
Control and Assimilation of Children into Soldiers 
When children are recruited by force they need to be moulded into soldiers by the guerrilla 
group or the conventional army. It needs to be note that when children are recruited, they 
undergo the same treatment as adults. This often includes brutal induction ceremonies. The 
use of physical and emotional abuse is meant to instil discipline and induce fear of 
superiors. This results in low self-esteem, guilt feelings, and violent solutions to problems 
by the recruits. 
 
In Angola the ideology of the paternal relationship of father to son and of the family was 
practised by both UNITA and MPLA where authority is traditionally derived from age and 
elders accorded a special status and respect in society. This had an influence on the way 
children were mobilized to join the war. UNITA was more successful at this as Savimbi 
exacted an unquestioning loyalty, styled himself as founder and father. All UNITA 
children called him ‘father’. This had an effect of dissociating the children from their 
families; instead they were made to rely on UNITA as ‘family’.154 Both UNITA and 
MPLA created youth movements for the politicisation of the youth to support the different 
movements and provide patriotic education for children. 
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The process was the same and was used in both Angola as well as in Mozambique. Threat 
of prison for evaders and deserters was used as well as claims of legitimacy to keep the 
recruits. Military training is designed to impart technical skills and incorporate the recruits 
into a new social order (the army). Moreover, it is meant to instill a sense of inevitability 
and pride in their new status. However, conscription by government forces is 
acknowledged as legitimate despite abuses as it is enacted into law contrary to insurgent 
recruitment which is devoid of such justification although it may be legitimized by the 
customary authority. To mould the children into soldiers, “UNITA and RENAMO used the 
threat of execution, transfer of recruits away from their home areas, fear of punishment by 
government forces, training and assimilation into the soldiers’ way of life.”155 
 
Under UNITA and RENAMO recruits faced severe punishment and threat of execution if 
they tried to desert. Executions for demonstration purposes were done to abducted recruits 
to prevent them from resisting and running away. Even those who failed to walk the long 
distances on the first day would be killed. Recruits were also transferred away from their 
homes to make it difficult for them to escape while others were posted in other districts or 
provinces and operated with people they did not know. UNITA made it more difficult by 
making the recruits walk for weeks or even months to Jamba area. Once in UNITA camps 
loyalty was enforced through a mixture of violence and indoctrination as the children 
would be incarcerated in a deep hole for several days in order to destroy resistance and the 
will to escape. The other reason they could not desert was that they were told that they 
would be killed by the government forces. During training and initiation, they were forced 
to commit acts of violence although this was not a general rule in Mozambique. 
 
In RENAMO, political mobilization was minimal as well as political meetings where the 
soldiers listened to the speeches of their President Dhlakama who mostly stressed themes 
such as, “we are against communism, socialism, we are for capitalism, we are against 
communal villages”.156 Therefore, the loyalty from the RENAMO recruits developed 
mainly from the social dynamics of the group than the political arguments. Moreover, 
ethnicity was not a major barrier to assimilation into the armed group as most commanders 
were Shona speaking and the soldiers came from all parts of Mozambique. This was not 
the case with UNITA where most officers and soldiers were volunteers and the social 
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context of forced recruitment was highly politicized with the majority soldiers from 
Umbundu speaking region.
157
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Chapter Four 
Case Variance and how variance in numbers impacted on Disarmament, 
Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) and post Conflict Society 
 
Introduction  
It can be tempting to assume that the use of child soldiers in conflict can be due to the 
breakdown of state control, and that only rebel groups and not states recruit and use child 
soldiers in war. However, data from many African conflicts is ambiguous and demonstrate 
a rather contrary trend towards the use of child soldiers by the state. For example, in the 
Sudanese civil war of 1993-2002, 64 per cent of the rebel forces were child soldiers 
compared to 36 per cent with the government. Later, this was reversed to 24 per cent 
(rebel) and 76 per cent (government) by 2004.
158
 
 
In this part I compare the explanations regarding the possible causes of the varied ratios 
between Angola and Mozambique civil wars in an effort to understand why apparently 
similar cases over almost the same time period had markedly different child soldier 
participation rates. Possible explanations for the use of child soldiers in these cases centre 
around forced recruitment, abduction, voluntary enlistment, poverty levels and orphan rates 
and points more to the structural features that contributed to the use and growth of child 
soldiers. Nevertheless their focus does not help in explaining why there was significant 
variation in the use of child soldiers in Angola and Mozambique. 
 
To have the alternative explanation therefore, there is a need to critically examine a 
number of issues in respect of the two countries. It needs to be noted that “previous 
research and existing explanations for child soldiering plus UN efforts have focused much 
attention on identifying the root causes of child soldiers”159 participation in armed conflict, 
little attention has focused on the variance in the use of child soldiers. 
 
Why Variance between Angola and Mozambique? 
To begin with, the huge disparity in the number of child combatants involved in the two 
cases under study can be due to the very nature of contemporary armed conflicts. The 
forces involved especially the rebel groups may have flat, non-hierarchical structures of 
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authority. Rebel groups often lack the institutional structures and means of control to 
account for their forces — especially children.  Such rebel groups may rely too much on 
the information provided by the tactical level commanders without verification. Therefore, 
the commanders on the ground may provide inaccurate information in regards to strength 
especially in respect to child soldiers. This may be worse if the tactical commanders know 
that the higher command is against the use of child soldiers. 
 
In the case of Mozambique, FRELIMO policies gave few people new opportunities for 
power and advancement. Those with education benefitted more while the majority 
remained highly dependent on state favours which later dwindled drastically. The policy of 
villagization became unpopular. It disrupted a lot of peasants across the board who were 
forced into the communal villages for reasons of necessity. Therefore, many young people 
joined RENAMO because they wanted to live as they wanted rather than being forced to 
stay in the communal villages. This cause made many join the war and accept death for the 
sake of freedom. Moreover, many people felt excluded and marginalized by the FRELIMO 
project and RENAMO capitalised on this discontent to persuade people politically of the 
need to overthrow FRELIMO.
160
 As RENAMO was a party predominantly located in the 
peripheral rural areas where people felt excluded from the state, political sympathy might 
have contributed to the use of child soldiers instead of them choosing to join government 
forces. 
 
RENAMO had a regular pattern of recruitment as compared to FRELIMO. Soldiers were 
sent out on recruitment campaigns, with orders to round up specific number of men and 
women of a certain age, usually between thirteen and seventeen.
161
 The recruits and their 
parents were told that the children were being taken to do a ‘job’ and would later return 
home after the completion of the task. This became a very important tactic as most young 
people were unemployed and eager to work. Therefore, it was used as an incentive to make 
them go more willingly. Moreover, the payment of salaries to guerrillas by the Rhodesians 
in the early phase of the war attracted both young men and their parents to accept the war 
as ‘work’. Further, RENAMO used a range of motivating tactics, some of which were 
more coercive than others. On the contrary, a significant number of children were taken by 
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RENAMO when they came across them by chance while working in the fields, feeding 
animals or fetching food for the family. Children were being conscripted most in the South 
of the country by RENAMO. This was because most men had left and migrated to work in 
South Africa which meant a shortage of adult men to fill the ranks. “Some children were 
taken from their homes often with the cooperation of the pro-rebel mambos (chiefs).”162 
This practice was common in the central and Northern provinces where local chiefs had 
great authority. 
 
RENAMO’s policy of courting support from religious communities in an attempt to gather 
into its fold all those marginalized by FRELIMO offers another explanation.
163
 It interacted 
very well with independent churches like the Catholic and the Zionist Churches as well as 
the protestant churches although it persecuted those which it perceived to be a threat to its 
power base and survival, such as the Jehovah’s Witnesses. Some soldiers integrated their 
religious beliefs into the war time work and some went to church before the war. This 
might have acted as a motivation factor for more children to join the war in Mozambique. 
  
The recruitment of students who dropped out of school by RENAMO may have led to high 
numbers of child soldiers within its rank. These young students were promised 
scholarships and jobs within the movement. Many women and children also joined to 
provide self-defence to their communities under the influence of the local leaders who 
proclaimed they could immunize them from bullets. On the other hand, many more 
children joined RENAMO rather than the government side because it was better equipped. 
The Mozambique government lacked financial resources to provide its army with 
expensive equipment like air and ground transport, or even basic supplies such as 
ammunition, food, combat boots and uniforms which led to low morale among the troops 
as well as the prospective child soldiers.
164
 This may have attracted more children to join 
the war in Mozambique especially on the RENAMO side. 
 
In Angola, the recruitment and use of child soldiers was mitigated by the involvement of 
Cuban soldiers and advisers. It is believed that about 50,000 troops participated in the war 
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mainly in support of the MPLA from 1975 to 1988.
165
 The involvement of the US military 
mainly the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and South African troops who cooperated in 
support of UNITA against the MPLA offers another explanation as to why few child 
soldiers were used. These two actors were also involved in the recruitment of mercenaries 
and propaganda campaigns against the MPLA government. Private military forces and 
mercenary Special Forces units were also used. Some of the private companies who 
operated in Angola were: Executive Outcomes (EO), Defence Systems Limited (DSL), 
Gray Security Limited, Alpha 5 Lda and Tele Service.
166
  While these security companies 
conducted training for the warring parties, they were also involved in combat support roles 
as well as in actual combat especially Executive Outcomes which provided combat 
services to the Angolan government in its military campaign against UNITA. On the other 
hand, the Angolan army was not exclusively black as it was combined of guerrilla veterans 
and former colonial troops.
167
 Hence the fewer child soldiers were recruited as a lot of 
international actors were involved. 
 
The desertion of many soldiers during the quartering and demobilisation is also a case in 
point. This weakened the government army and reduced its strength especially during 
1991-1992 period in Angola while UNITA troops remained disciplined and in military 
camps.
168
 A number of child soldiers may have deserted during the quartering and 
demobilisation as well. Moreover, Angola had a bigger number of officers with secondary 
education than in Mozambique which meant that they were in a better position to 
understand that it was against international law to recruit and use children in war.
169
 
 
Based on the accounts above, it can be justified that more children were used in the 
Mozambican war than in Angolan war. In Mozambique, mainly RENAMO recruited 
children under the age of eighteen into its armed group contrary to International Law. 
Evidence shows that since the late 1980s, RENAMO recruited much larger numbers of 
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even younger children, ten years old or younger.
170
 RENAMO preferred children to adult 
combatants because they believed them to be better fighters. 
 
Social Impact   
Wood notes that the consequences of military socialization for combatants though not well 
documented, include the effects of recruitment and training processes as well as the effects 
of witnessing and wielding violence.
171
 On the other hand Wessels argues that, “child 
soldiering is grounded in the wider exploitation of children in situations of armed conflict 
and it should be viewed as part of a wider system of violence.”172 This is regardless of 
whether the child soldiers were recruited by force or volunteered. The process of using 
child soldiers caused massive damage to them, violates human rights and plant seeds of 
future violence and armed conflict. The child soldiers who survived the ordeal of the wars 
in both Angola and Mozambique were faced with emotional scars and severe trauma which 
hinder the child's stability and ability to go on with his or her normal life.  
 
The images and memories of the war's worst moments experienced still linger in the 
children’s life. According to Wessels for example, “many Angolan children report 
nightmares and flashbacks, display heightened aggressiveness, and suffer from 
hopelessness.”173  This made them believe that no one could understand their situation and 
therefore ended up living in a combination of pain and guilt, sadness, depression and social 
isolation.
174
 These traumatized children do not have a vision for the future and fail to move 
forward. On the other hand, as they were taught during the war not to rely on anyone, they 
fail to trust fellow children as well as adults after the conflict. Further, they will tend to use 
violent methods to get what they want, beat other children, steal and oppress others just as 
was done to them in the bush. Moreover, they viewed violence as normal and part of life as 
they were socialized into violence during the war. The fear for their own security also 
lingers for long periods, so the child often will carry homemade weapons for protection or 
hides at night under the covers.
175
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There was also a sense of social promotion provided by the gun. Power relations were 
reversed as young people became masters over civilian elders. In the case of RENAMO, 
they subscribed to its political platform to return power to local chiefs, and declared 
themselves as believing in local traditional rules, social structures and hierarchies.
176
 This 
was due to instructions from the RENAMO leadership to ‘respect the elders’ and avoid 
robbing civilians. On the contrary, some disobeyed this. Authority figures outside the base 
were purely ignored or even challenged, and the parents and social workers had a very hard 
time understanding them, and felt threatened.
177
 However, most obeyed the chiefs’ rules 
for fear of the consequences of spiritual retribution. Another aspect of the social promotion 
afforded to the child soldiers in the guerrilla army was control over women. Liaisons with 
women in RENAMO areas were forbidden by the military leadership rather than promoted. 
They were forced to form their relationships with local women clandestinely and even 
more cautiously with female guerrillas.
178
 It was the women in the enemy area who were 
captured and sexually abused while those in own area of control were to be treated with 
caution and approached according to normal social rules. 
 
Military life for the children meant being separated and away from ones family. The child 
soldiers lacked normal growth and development process as they were far from their 
community and its structures. These children who were used as soldiers grew up faster 
because of what they saw, did and experienced. Moreover, Brett and McCallin observed 
that, “by being child soldiers and being separated from their families’ children loose access 
to the social, moral and cultural values of their community, which can create an irreversible 
gap at an older age.”179 
 
Reintegration of Child Soldiers 
 
Angola 
The reintegration of fighters in Angola at the end of the civil war occurred against the 
backdrop of increased concern for children as a special group of ex-combatants.
180
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However, the Angolan experience demonstrates that children were excluded from the 
reintegration programme by the very regime which used them in the war. Both parties did 
not want to admit the existence of child soldiers within their ranks. On the part of the 
Angolan government, it was more difficult to admit because it had ratified the earlier 
Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1990 forbidding the recruitment of children under 
15 as soldiers before it was amended to 18 years.
181
 In this case, the government opted to 
treat the child soldiers as dependents of the older soldiers as it was afraid of being seen to 
include children in the national army and this resulted in them not receiving the benefits of 
the reintegration. Moreover, the national DDR process only served those who were twenty 
years of age or older and was designed mainly as part of a security sector reform effort.
182
  
 
The failure to target the child soldiers was linked to the broader discourse that underpins 
reintegration of child soldiers specifically. The emphasis has been on a flawed construction 
of children as vulnerable and in need of assistance after war. This has resulted in child 
soldiers being marginalised during the post conflict transition. Further, the protection 
regime (organisations that look after the special protection of children in armed conflict) 
has emphasised the need to protect children by separating them from adults and that 
underage fighters should not be given money. This is meant to prevent future recruitment 
of children or their re-recruitment as money may act as a motivating factor in that case. On 
the contrary, it may be argued that child reintegration programmes are meant to reintegrate 
children back into the very same conditions that made them to join the conflict like 
poverty, and political marginalization among others. This part therefore will assess whether 
the approach taken by the Angolan government was effective according to success criteria 
of child protection regimes. 
 
According to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the Optional Protocol, 
the use of soldiers under the age of 18 was not allowed. The government of Angola 
decided not to process UNITA child soldiers for demobilisation. Those underage were then 
treated as dependants of older combatants and not as soldiers themselves as explained 
above. Another explanatory factor can be that because few children were used as soldiers, 
it made it easier to ignore or hide. This then meant that child soldiers were excluded from 
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the formal DDR programme. Moreover, all the discussions before the Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) did not address the issue of child soldiers. This meant that the 
parties failed to anticipate the problems and provide remedies for child soldiers who were 
within their ranks.
183
 The child soldiers did not benefit from the reintegration allowance of 
about $100 and a reinsertion kit of tools and household items regardless of playing a 
significant role during the armed conflict. 
 
The issue of child involvement and reintegration became complicated in how to define 
‘child soldier’ during that long period of civil war. This was due to the fact that some 
children joined the conflict when they were under 18 and were adults by the time of 
demobilisation. In this case therefore, the distinction between adults and children lost its 
salience in the context of the duration of the fighting. It is against this background that still 
under aged child soldiers were not absorbed into the national army; but ones who were 
now adults were and thus their reintegration process was different from that of adults.
184
 
Further, male child soldiers were separated from adults. This was meant to protect them 
from exploitation by the adults and to guard them from being recruited again. They were 
sent to reception areas where they received specific interventions. This included temporary 
shelter and food, family tracing and reunification, family mediation services, psychosocial 
counselling, education support and vocational training.
185
 
 
In this case, child exclusion in Angola was due to the pressure of the CRC. The CRC 
wanted the children to receive the “child rights package”, which comprised birth 
registration and civil identification documents, access to family tracing and reunification 
services, education and skills training, and psychosocial support.
186
 This influenced the 
government into not taking on board UNITA child soldiers and hence denying them 
political and material rights they could have claimed which could change their well-being 
such as land ownership. It is difficult therefore, to assess child reintegration in Angola in 
the context of their exclusion from the formal DDR programme regardless of the UN 
Security Council Resolution 1379 which called on armed parties to consider the views of 
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children in designing child focussed DDR programmes as well as financial institutions like 
the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) who should have provided for 
child demobilisation and reintegration.
187
 The Angolan government as well as the World 
Bank felt short of this requirement as it was not inclusive of all war affected children. 
 
The Angolan case therefore presents a strange paradox with respect to child soldier 
reintegration. While the Angolan government and World Bank asserted the special needs 
and rights of child soldiers, they were excluded from the formal programmes and were not 
adequately targeted. Child soldiers were rendered invisible in Angola as the programmes 
which were put in place did not reintegrate them. To promote the best interest of child 
soldiers, there was a need to consider that the voices of the child soldiers were taken on 
board in shaping the contours, duration and nature of the DDR programmes. Child soldiers 
should not to be looked at as passive victims of war, but as vital social capital of ideas and 
solutions after armed conflict. McMullin sums it very well, “Children and youth were not 
consulted before or during the design and implementation of DDR. They became 
invisible—not political agents whose participation was key to the peace process, or 
economic labourers whose skills, ideas and aspirations were necessary for post-conflict 
reconstruction, but traumatised victims to be sent back to an imagined and idealised pre-
conflict life of family and school.”188 Consequently in the post war period these children 
may end up becoming criminals like thieves or armed robbers to meet their ends. 
 
Mozambique  
After the war in Mozambique most child soldiers were taken to demobilization centres 
while others were reunited with their relatives or put in foster care through the help of Red 
Cross, local and international organisations such as Save the Children Fund.
189
 However, 
the number of the underage soldiers were few during the time of demobilisation, 27.67% 
(25 700) were younger than 18 at the time of recruitment.
190
 The first group of child 
soldiers came from RENAMO and was placed in a recuperation centre where a group of 
                                                          
187
 UNSC 1379. (2001). Paras 8, 12. 
188
 Jaremey McMullin. (2011). p 757. 
189
 Alcinda Honwana. (1999). Negotiating Postwar Identities: Child Soldiers in Mozambique and Angola. 
Codesria Bulletin. Available: http://sicher.medico.de/download/report26/ps_honwana_en.pdf. Accessed: 10-
07-2013. 
190
 Mark Malan. (2000). Disarming and Demobilising Child Soldiers: The Underlying Challenges. African 
Security Review. 9(5/6). Available: 
http://www.cihc.org/members/resource_library_pdfs/4_Beneficiaries/4_4_Child_Soldiers/DDR%20for%20C
hild%20Soldiers.pdf. Accessed: 11-07-2013. 
 
 
54 
 
child psychologists worked with them. This was not successful because the child soldiers 
were removed from their community and cultural environment, and were asked to talk 
about their painful memories as a way of healing. This failed because Western 
psychological approaches of diagnosis and healing distress and trauma were applied to a 
society that possessed very different ontologies, social and cultural patterns. This Western 
approach neglected completely the role that the ancestral spirits and other spiritual forces 
play in the processes of causation and healing of mental health problem. 
 
In Mozambique as well as Angola, people believed that war-related psychological trauma 
was directly linked with the anger of the spirits of the dead killed during the war and that 
the spirits had capacity to harm those that killed them or mistreated them in life and had to 
be appeased to have peace. Those who were involved in the war, killed or saw people 
being killed were considered polluted and therefore seen as vehicles through which the 
spirits of those who died during the war might enter and afflict the community. The child 
soldiers as well as refugees were believed to be potential contaminators of the social body 
upon their return home. Therefore, the cleansing process was seen as a fundamental 
condition for collective protection against social pollution and for the social reintegration 
of war affected people into society. As such, rituals were performed for former child 
soldiers to cleanse them of war atrocities and as a break from the past.
191
  
 
The rituals involved the washing of the body in the river, the burning of the clothes brought 
from the war, slaughtering of chicken and the use of herbal remedies to cleanse the body. 
The rituals were aimed at:  asking for forgiveness, appeasing the souls of the dead, and 
preventing any future afflictions (retaliations) from the spirits of the dead, in this way 
serving the links with that “bad” past.192 Therefore, the child soldiers in Mozambique had 
to acknowledge the negative identities and appease those who died during the war to avoid 
being haunted by them. It was therefore through this unmasking and acknowledgment of 
the past that child soldiers created new identities based on the rejection of all the links past 
memories could reveal. 
 
On the other hand, family tracing and reunification programme, community sensitization 
campaigns and apprenticeships programmes were set up to assist the reintegration of the 
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child soldiers into their communities.
193
 Family tracing and reunification involved the 
identification, documentation, searching and reuniting the child soldiers with their families. 
In certain cases the reunification was followed by cleansing ceremonies which were meant 
to clean the souls of those who have been altered from war and allow them to start new 
lives. Sensitization campaigns to support the reintegration of former child soldiers were 
also initiated. These were meant for the population to take collective responsibility for the 
fate of the returnees. Local military, police, teachers and community leaders were targeted 
and encouraged to take part in the initiative and this had a positive impact on community 
acceptance of former child soldiers. Apprenticeships training in carpentry, mason and other 
skilled labourers were established. This was meant to teach basic employment and business 
skills. In other cases, some families got education stipend for fees, book and clothes to 
support the demobilised child soldiers go to school. 
 
The relative success of the reintegration of child soldiers in Mozambique offers a beacon of 
hope for humanity. This was due to the fact that both the soldiers and victims understood 
that savage use of violence was to destroy both personal integrity and family relations.
194
 
The combination of modern techniques and the traditional ones proved to be more effective 
as psychological approaches were combined with traditional ways of healing as discussed 
above. Further, Mozambican policy from the 1980s centred on the community and this was 
achieved by first giving material assistance to vulnerable families so they could sustain 
their children who were involved in the civil war and then assisting to reunite children with 
families as quickly as possible. Christians, Muslims and traditional religious leaders were 
all involved in the purification rituals for cleansing and reintegrating the child soldiers. 
Moreover, responsibility for injustice in Mozambique was not an individual concern but 
rather a societal issue. In this regards, that is why families of the perpetrators of violence 
performed ceremonies to placate the spirits, and often a community paid compensation 
even during the war such as goats, cows and seed to an embattled village.  
 
Two programmes devised in Mozambique - one for healing traumatised children and one 
for tracing children separated from family members - built on Mozambican traditions and 
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cultures.
195
  The negative legacy of war was de-emphasised. For example, traumatised 
children were not viewed as pathological, but as family members who needed nurturing. 
Apart from relying highly technical 'expertise' or equipment, indigenous knowledge of the 
issue was also used by the community. On the other hand, healing through play (Brincar 
curando) was also used from 1993 and was promoted in six provinces by the Mozambican 
Red Cross.
196
 In this, children were encouraged to concentrate and participate in group 
games, story-telling, theatre, and songs which were meant to reinforce Mozambican 
cultures and increase social interaction among all children involved in the civil war. In the 
process, those who needed additional attention were distinguished if they exhibit contrary 
behaviour, such as not joining in the play, inability to focus, or hostility. This helped 
everyone deal with their own war experiences as the community helped and was part in the 
process. Gradually, this helped in rebuilding trust and as a result more child soldiers were 
able to go to school and to learn productive skills. However, a sombre refrain to the 
Mozambican success story is that neither demobilisation nor tracing seems to have 
occurred for the girls, who were forced sexual partners. They were not reintegrated. 
 
Therefore, while the different approaches to the DDR process between Angola and 
Mozambique could be attributed to Mozambique having more child soldiers and something 
had to be done to address the situation, it needs to be noted that DDR programmes are 
country specific and depends on a number of factors. It can be due to policy design, 
objectives of and variety of needs of different combatants as well as the inclusiveness of 
the peace process. Further, in Mozambique, it was seen as a security strategy to consolidate 
peace and neutralize potential spoilers. The international community saw reintegration in 
Mozambique from this perspective as well and the need to achieve negative peace (the 
absence of violence).
197
 The successful reintegration therefore justifies the low occurance 
of domestic violence in post conflict Mozambique as compared to Angola which went back 
to war after 1992. 
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Summary of the variables present in both cases 
 High levels of poverty 
 High levels of unemployment/economic marginalization 
 High levels of ethnic fractionalization 
 Insufficient numbers of military personnel 
 Desire to take control of events/ protection offered by using the gun 
 Forced recruitment 
 Political motivation 
 
Summary of variables that did not seem to contribute significantly to the use of child 
soldiers 
 Revenge  
 Availability of small arms  
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Chapter 5 
The Legal Environment Child Soldiers Operated and the Role Played by Civil 
Society and International Organisations 
 
Introduction 
The use of child soldiers and the terrible impact they suffer in conflicts has not gone 
unnoticed. The impact of armed conflict on children has moved to the forefront of 
academic, political, and humanitarian agendas worldover. Many organizations have 
launched programmes to address the issue of child soldiers and other children affected by 
armed conflicts as well as to promote protection and support. Moreover, the issue has 
become a topic of interest in academic circles and the participation of children in war has 
even become a theme for novels and films such as Child soldiers of Africa, Stolen 
Children, the Will of a Child Soldier and Soldier Child
198
 just to mention a few. It needs to 
be noted that children's involvement in war defies established and generally accepted 
norms and values with regard to the fundamental categories of childhood and adulthood, as 
well as the international conventions of modern warfare.
199
 Children are associated with 
innocence, weakness, and dependence upon adult guidance and nurturance in the society. 
On the contrary, soldiers are associated with strength, aggression, and the responsible 
maturity of adulthood. In this context, children need to be protected and defended all the 
time while a soldier's duty stereotypically is to protect and defend the nation and the weak 
like children. In this regard, the international community has taken several significant steps 
to address the problem and stop the phenomenon of child soldiers. Therefore, this chapter 
will focus on the international legal standards which define the international regime for 
child protection in respect of the use and plight of children in armed conflict. 
 
The Legal Environment 
The plight of children in conflict has led to the adoption of international instruments to 
protect children, and in particular child soldiers.
200
 The international community has tried 
to address the issue of children being involved in war like any other human rights 
violations that need greater attention. The use of children in armed conflicts is a breach of 
international humanitarian law. The process to establish an international legal protection of 
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children in armed conflicts dates back to the end of the First World War by the League of 
Nations. This resulted in the adoption of the Declaration on the Rights of the Child in 1924 
which provided that in times of distress children be the first to receive relief. Article 38 of 
the 1989 International Convention on the Rights of the Child stipulates that state parties 
shall take responsibilities to ensure that persons who have not attained the age of 15 shall 
not take part in armed conflicts.
201
 The 1999 African Charter on Human Rights and the 
Rights of the Child (Art 22) affirms that no person under the age of 18 should be drafted to 
take part in armed conflicts. However, developed countries USA, Soviet Union, Britain and 
Canada argued for 15 years to be the minimum age when the issue was being discussed. 
Their argument was based on Humanitarian Law and their national legal systems.
202
 
Interestingly, when the age of 15 was initially chosen, several states objected preferring the 
minimum age to be 18.
203
 This therefore forced the developed countries to undertake an 
obligation not to allow children under the age of 18 take part in armed conflict. Further, the 
1948 Universal Declaration for Human Rights, the 1949 Geneva Convention (Art IV) 
protects children from taking part in hostilities. The 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of 
the Child bans compulsory recruitment under the age of 18. This is the most widely ratified 
human rights treaty in history by almost all countries except United States.
204
 
 
Article 19 of the African Charter on Human and Welfare of the Child, states that unless 
upon his will, every child shall be entitled to the enjoyment of parental care and protection 
while Article 18 of the same, the family is seen as the natural unit and basis of society.
205
 
In practice this was not the case. In Angola and Mozambique, many children were 
abducted from their families, schools, on the streets and homes, and forced to follow 
soldiers into military camps and join war activities despite these treaties and protocols 
being in place.
206
 
 
In Africa, a conference was held in Maputo, Mozambique in 1999 which focused on the 
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. Representatives of governments, 
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international and non-governmental organisations met to discuss the issue in an African 
context and at the end the conference adopted the Maputo Declaration on the use of 
Children as soldiers.
207
 The declaration was later to be presented to the Organisation of 
African Union (OAU) to be adopted as a formal resolution. The conference set 18 years as 
the minimum age without exception and prohibits the recruitment and use of child soldiers 
in armed conflict. 
 
United Nations agencies have also addressed the issue. The International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) adopted a Convention concerning the Prohibition and Immediate 
Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour in 1999.
208
 Article 3(a) specifically 
prohibits the 'forced and compulsory recruitment of children for use in armed conflict’. 
Some states sought an absolute ban on child soldiers and this was expected to be a useful 
tool for campaign against the use of child soldiers. The legal status of child soldiers is also 
covered in the statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) especially Article 2 which 
states that it is a war crime to recruit children to participate in hostilities.
209
  
 
How the Treaties or Protocols have addressed the Variables 
International treaties and protocols have tried to address the issues of poverty, education, 
unemployment and many more. The 1959 Declaration on the Rights of the Child (Principle 
7) states clearly that a child is entitled to receive education which shall be free and 
compulsory.
210
 Moreover, the African Charter on the Rights of the Child 1999 (Art. 11) 
provides that “every child shall have the right to education”.211 Article 26 of the 1948 
United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that “everyone has the right 
to education”212 and this is further supported by the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) 
no 2 which calls upon states to achieve universal primary education.
213
 On the other hand 
the issue of poverty is addressed by MDG no1 which is committed to eradicate extreme 
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poverty and hunger.
214
 Further, under the African Charter on the Rights and welfare of the 
Child (Art.22) state parties are urged to respect and ensure respect for rules of International 
Humanitarian Law applicable in armed conflict which affect the child and that no child 
should take direct part in hostilities and should refrain from recruiting any child, while 
article 29 strictly prohibits abduction of children.
215
  
 
However, it is seen that the international legal standards, treaties and protocols are not 
sufficient to protect the children as enforcement has often been ignored by a number of 
states and armed groups. There is need for more practical and pragmatic actions to respond 
to the use of children in conflict who suffer from human rights abuses. 
 
Human Right Abuses 
The wars in Angola and Mozambique were protracted and marked by extreme violence and 
brutality against civilians especially women and children regardless of the above 
international instruments to protect children in conflict. These included mutilations and 
disfigurement, psychological torture, physical and sexual violence. Many people either 
became refugees or internally displaced persons. Both boys and girls were affected by the 
economic, political, social, psychological and physical effects of the war.  
 
The civil war between FRELIMO and RENAMO (1976–1992) in Mozambique captured 
public attention more than the other periods and types of violence, due to the magnitude of 
destruction and appalling human suffering.
216
 The mutilation of civilians in Mozambique 
involved the cutting of breasts, ears, noses, lips and sexual organs. Corpses were also 
mutilated and it became one of the most characteristic abuses of the Mozambican war. 
Civilians accounted for more than 95 percent of the casualties.
217
 These were the central 
parts of the RENAMO strategy of advertising its presence and strength as well as a form of 
terrorizing the civilians and government soldiers. Most women were raped and became 
concubines to RENAMO as well as government soldiers.
218
 Further, the sixteen years of 
war in Mozambique produced an estimated 200,000 to 300,000 war orphans. Moreover, 
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some orphans were used for pornography by European men. Worse still, they were forcing 
a dog to have sex with girls.
219
 
 
On the other hand, FRELIMO soldiers were also responsible for incidents of mutilation. 
FRELIMO and RENAMO both were involved in killing of civilians during operations to 
force them relocate to areas under their control and in some cases as punishment for 
assisting the enemy. However, largest killings were carried by RENAMO though 
government troops were also involved as explained above. It needs to be noted that both 
FRELIMO and RENAMO only punished their soldiers for offences committed against 
civilians if those offences were committed in the area under their control and not in 
contested areas.  
 
Both armed groups exercised control over civilians as a means to deny the other group 
access to supplies held by the population like labour, food etc. and establish legitimacy. 
The forced control of the populace involved a number of abuses like forced relocation 
which was carried by both sides, restriction on movement and economic activity. Forced 
conscription of young men became common method by RENAMO, though FRELIMO also 
used it to obtain its combatants. RENAMO even used child soldiers less than ten years of 
age. Moreover, “the process of forcible recruitment such as capture, enlistment and 
enforcement of discipline involved numerous human rights abuses.”220 
 
In Angola, every group was responsible for human rights abuses including mass killings, 
disappearances, illegal detentions, extra-judicial executions, torture, forced displacement, 
forced conscription, sexual enslavement and abuse, and others.
221
  Civilians suffered under 
government forces in the form of harassment, extortion, property dispossession and rape;
222
 
and were forcibly removed from their land to urban centres. Crops were destroyed to make 
sure UNITA troops had no access to food. In the process, force was used and this 
sometimes resulted in death of civilians including women and children.
223
 Civilians were 
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also put at higher risk of death due to starvation and infectious diseases as the government 
failed to provide basic needs such as food and health care in contested or UNITA held 
areas.  
 
On the other hand, UNITA targeted civilian population and inflicted protracted violence. 
Government supporters and informers were mainly targeted in the process as well as 
women, old men, nuns, and children. In later stages of the war UNITA took responsibility 
and pride in these abuses in contrast to earlier periods when it had apologized for abuse as 
collateral damage or denied it altogether.
224
  The violence committed evolved into heighted 
brutality as torture, the sexual mutilation of victims and the dead, and rape became status 
quo. Combatants participated in increasingly horrifying and ritualized forms of torture.
225
 
UNITA added gruesome tactics to its repertoire which including the use of human shields 
in combat, death by crucifixion, taxing food and public witch-burnings among others.
226
 
  
 Further, civilians who stayed in UNITA controlled areas were prevented from leaving and 
sometimes forced to follow UNITA troops and provide support services.
227
  According to 
Amnesty International, a lack of a sense of accountability by both government and UNITA 
persisted throughout the war, in which both parties avoided investigations of abuses and 
ignored calls to implement corrective or preventive measures.
228
 
 
Why Child Soldiers have not been Protected?  
Children in conflict have not been protected regardless of the sheer volume of declarations, 
protocols, resolutions, charters, treaties and conventions being enormous as stated above. A 
plethora of intergovernmental organisations have signed and committed their member 
states to the protection of children. This seems to be only on paper as armed groups and 
combatants seem to be complete strangers to the laws of armed conflict and customary 
international law as well as other protocols. This is due to several problems. 
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The reluctance and failure of the international community to enforce its own standards on 
child soldiers is a major problem.
229
  Many states and organisations who are signatories 
enforce these standards incorrectly and in a selective manner, and often due to strategic 
self-interests, pay lip service to the implementation of the child protection standards. The 
other reason is due to the social construction of the meaning of childhood in Africa as 
compared to the Western understanding. The different meaning, understanding and 
perception of being a child in Africa undermine and dilute the practical implementation of 
international protection mechanism. For example, while the African Charter defines a child 
as being under 18, in some African societies this distinction is blurred between the 
adolescent age of 14 and upwards, to the age of young adult and/or youngster of 18.
230
 
Moreover, traditional ceremonies that mark the passage from one age-grade to another, like 
from puberty to adulthood confer on children as young as 14 the status and obligation of 
adulthood. It needs to be noted therefore that the restrictive, Western-centric view of what 
a child is, does not correspond to other contexts. However, it has been accepted as a 
globally accepted definition of a child or childhood in spite of it being contrary to African 
construct and of the fact that childhood differs in different societies. Therefore, the 
international definition of a child is problematic and bears limited relevance to the socio-
cultural context of children and social construction of childhood across much of Africa.
231
 
Furthermore, the tasks performed by child soldiers are generally perceived as an extension 
of traditional child labour practices in much of Africa. It is important to note that the 
debate between universal and cultural relativist construction of childhood has been 
controversial and has undermined negotiations of the Conventions of the Rights of the 
Child and the Optional Protocol for many years.
232
 
 
Another reason is that most African states have found it difficult to incorporate 
international treaties (law) into their domestic laws due to the fact that they think that if 
they do so, they agree to uphold certain fundamental rights and protection of children. 
However, the ratification of these treaties has not led to immediate enforcement powers in 
national law.
233
 This is so regardless of a number of treaties providing grounds for 
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jurisdiction over international crimes and empowering to prosecute war crimes, crimes 
against humanity and genocide. In this case, states are reluctant to exercise that 
jurisdiction. According to Cassese, states have failed to exercise their criminal jurisdiction 
over those responsible for international crimes and to enact the legislation to implement 
duly ratified international treaties; some states have entered reservations upon ratification 
of some international treaties. Other states have evaded their inter-national obligations by 
passing implementing legislation that restricts or narrows the scopes or ground of 
jurisdiction outlined in the international treaties and national courts have often developed 
in their judicial practice a restrictive tendency to limit as much as possible the impact of 
international rules or the exercise of jurisdiction by national courts over international 
crimes.
234
 Moreover, many states that have signed such conventions, some have not put 
into place the constitutional process or adopted the necessary legislative measures to give 
effect to the child protection mechanisms.
235
 
  
The other reason has been the lack of individual punishment as a preventive measure in the 
past. The current mechanism to give power to international child protection mechanisms 
will help in addressing the issue of the recruitment and use of children in armed conflict is 
a war crime under customary international law. Hopefully, it will end the culture of 
recruiting and using child soldiers by holding leaders accountable for these abuses. This 
has seen the recent arrest and prosecution of the former president of Liberia, Charles 
Taylor in 2006 by the ICC and the Congolese warlord Lubanga Dyilo, accused of 
conscripting child soldiers in the DRC war.
236
 But these are only two people and not many 
have been prosecuted. 
 
Roles played by Civil Society and International Organisations 
Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) played important roles during the Mozambican and 
Angolan wars to secure and build peace though their actions were limited. This was due to 
the fact that CSOs do not have the legal, political or military power. They only have the 
power to persuade, change people’s perception about the conflict and raise awareness of 
the costs of the conflict and the benefits of having a political solution. Moreover, it is 
difficult for CSOs to operate amidst lawlessness. Further, the role of CSOs in the 
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promotion of peace and security remains contested by some who see CSOs as either 
irrelevant or a threat to the sovereignty of the state.
237
  
 
In Mozambique, their role included the performance of plays and dances that condemned 
the war, peace marches, conciliatory soccer matches between opposing side, and special 
ceremonies to heal and reintegrate victims of war into their communities including child 
soldiers.
238
 Women also played an important role in all these initiatives and provided 
support to the many women and children displaced or affected by the war.
239
  Further, 
village female spiritual healers (curandeiras) played important roles fortifying village 
residents against the threat of attack or cleansing and reintegrating them into communities 
if they had been kidnapped, raped or had gone off to fight.
240
 
 
The community of Saint’Egidio helped orphans, students and others suffering from the 
war.
241
 They developed ties to missionaries and served in the no-man’s-land or in the war 
zones controlled by RENAMO. Church leaders also worked hard by asking both 
FRELIMO and RENAMO to commit to the principle of renouncing violence as a way to 
bring about change.
242
 This became the basis for dialogue. It is noteworthy that plans 
initiated by the ICRC in late 1980s and early 1990 were not successful because RENAMO 
made it difficult to have access to the children within its ranks.
243
 Later, UNICEF 
negotiated with RENAMO and FRELIMO leadership to have access to child soldiers. One 
of UNICEF’s objectives was to establish contact with the child soldiers, facilitate their 
reunification with their families and integrate them into civilian life. This was a success 
because of the willingness of the child soldiers to be reunified with their families. Apart 
from UNICEF, other NGOs such as the Alliance Save the Children and World Food 
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Programme (WFP) also assisted in the process. Save the Children Foundation (SCF) 
helped in reuniting the children with their families.
244
 
 
Government and traditional healers also helped child soldiers in Mozambique. The 
government started an initiative called “Child in Difficult Situation” in 1  5 to help 
children victims of war and child combatants in reuniting with their families or substitute 
family in case it did not exist.  In 1988 this initiative was reinforced by the Programme for 
Family Localisation and Reunification (PLRF) which coordinated social structures and 
NGOs actions in provision of assistance to children affected by the war.
245
  
 
Traditional healers also complemented the work done by UNICEF, the government and 
NGOs in assisting child soldiers. The initiatives were drawn from traditional customs and 
rituals to overcome the problem. This was based on the belief that “when an individual 
leaves his community for a certain period of time and comes in contact with other social 
groups, he always runs the risk of learning harmful, improper and strange things, which 
can pollute his community when he returns.”246 In this case, those who were involved in 
the war or became victims had to undergo through cleansing ritual which was meant to 
facilitate the reintegration of the child soldier into the community. It was also meant to 
ensure acceptance and forgiveness of the members of the community.                                                                   
 
In Angola, CSOs played an important role in regards to the child soldiers. Organisations 
like the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers assisted in the identification of child 
soldiers who served with UNITA and government forces. The Human Rights Watch 
focused on the human rights abuses while UNICEF provided psychological support to 
former child soldiers. Other international organizations provided basic foods and medical 
care to residents in many of the quartering areas.
247
 
 
During reintegration, UN agencies and children's rights groups implemented several 
programmes aimed at rehabilitating ex-child soldiers. The programmes formulated by 
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CSOs focused on family and community reunification, psychological support and 
education opportunities. Some child soldiers were given building materials to construct 
their own homes. This was done in consultation with family or community leaders to 
provide land to the child soldiers to construct their new home.
248
 Cultural cleansing 
ceremonies were also conducted. These ceremonies acted as healing agents mainly for 
young girls who were forced into marriages without which they would have been 
considered as social outcasts. 
 
The reintegration programme in Angola is an example of successful cooperation between 
government and CSOs. There was also collaboration between international CSOs and the 
churches that assisted in family reunification and follow up support services on 
demobilised child soldiers as well as helping them access education and vocational training 
opportunities which was run by ILO.
249
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Chapter Six 
 
Conclusion 
 
The main objective of this thesis was to investigate why more child soldiers were used in 
Mozambican war than in the Angolan war. The study was guided by a number of 
hypotheses among which were if high levels of poverty, unemployment, ethnic 
fractionalization, insufficient numbers of military personnel and the failure of the groups 
hierarchy to punish subordinates for infractions or lacks groups norms concerning violence 
against civilians will result in more child soldiers being used in armed conflict. In the cases 
of Angola and Mozambique, this thesis has shown that; high levels of poverty, high levels 
of unemployment, high levels of ethnic fractionalization, insufficient numbers of military 
personnel, desire to take control of events/ protection offered by using the gun and forced 
recruitment were the main reasons child soldiers were used in the conflicts. This is also in 
line with the Economic Roots Theory and the Relative Deprivation Theory as explained in 
Chapter 1 under theoretical foundation. 
 
This thesis has further demonstrated that armed conflicts are associated with human 
suffering which is borne by the civilian population. Civilians are targeted by the warring 
parties and pay the heaviest cost. However, big variations exist with regard to the extent 
civilians suffer at the hands of the warring factions over time, across conflicts, and across 
countries experiencing civil wars. This is so because different armed groups exhibit 
different patterns of behaviour in dealing with civilian populations. This can take the form 
of launching campaigns of ethnic cleansing, displacement, extermination and abduction of 
children to fill the ranks. Other armed groups have shown restraint in their relationship 
with civilians and perpetrated low levels of violence. 
 
In Africa children have been used in political campaigns, liberation struggles and 
insurgencies as they form the majority of the population. This thesis therefore has looked 
at the use of child soldiers in the Angolan and Mozambican civil wars as comparative case 
studies against the background that the two wars took place almost the same period and 
under almost the same conditions but had divergent usage of child soldiers.  Reports show 
that more child soldiers were used in Mozambique (25,498) than in Angola (8,000). The 
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thesis has further looked at the factors that led to the use of child soldiers, how and why the 
phenomenon of child soldiers takes place in different context.  
 
Motives and Patterns for the Recruitment of Child Soldiers in the Angolan Civil War 
The parties to the civil war in Angola came to understand the significance of young people 
in the conflict and in the maintenance of power. This realization paved the way for forced 
recruitment of young people and children to increase their fighting strength and ensure that 
a section of the Angolan society supported them with loyalty. Children made up more than 
half of the population and as such provided a fertile resource to the armies. Children also 
became victims of conscription practices. This was due to the reluctance of a majority of 
Angolan people to fight. This pushed the government to recruit even children. In the 
process, some children were press ganged or kidnapped, while others were forced to join to 
defend their families. Moreover, there were few opportunities available to them in terms of 
formal education and jobs. As a result, they were easily mobilised and incorporated into the 
dynamics of the war. The move by UNITA to expand into a regular force led it to recruit 
and use children as well; a strategy called by Savimbi “the theory of large numbers.”250 
Local commanders were ordered to abduct from government controlled territories in order 
to meet their quotas of recruits. Coercion and intimidation was also used. 
 
On the part of the children, the rewards of military life provided some positive incentive in 
the form of independence from family. By being in possession of a gun they had access to 
food, loot and women. This applied to Mozambique as well. Other opportunities for 
advancement in the army also existed in the form of overseas training in Morocco and 
other countries and scholarships in Portugal.  
 
There were mixed patterns of recruitment in Angola although it was less prominent than in 
Mozambique. Those who joined in 1974-1976 did so voluntarily because they considered 
UNITA as the natural movement for their Umbundu Region and for ethnically diverse 
Moxico Province. In this case, they joined because of an emotional attachment to kinship 
and tribe.  Later, children were recruited by force or were being abducted. Forced 
recruitment was wide spread in the 1980s. The trend therefore seems to be that of 
predominantly voluntary recruitment at the start of the war to forced recruitment as the war 
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progressed. This trend could be due to war fatigue and the need to increase bayonet 
strength (fighting force) for conventional warfare on both sides. 
 
Some children said they joined UNITA to fight for political reasons after being frustrated 
with the situation they found themselves in. This could be due to political motivation under 
UNITA education and propaganda. It may also be linked to feelings of grievances against 
the government for lack of opportunities like education and jobs as well as the culture of 
violence and displacement. Many of the children had never experienced peace since they 
were born. Some had witnessed relatives being killed by government troops or police, 
UNITA or by the Cubans. 
 
Motives and Patterns for the Recruitment of Child Soldiers in the Mozambique Civil 
War 
In Mozambique, RENAMO recruited young boys into its ranks. Girls were recruited as 
personal servants. These later became wives providing sexual services. The government of 
Mozambique, under FRELIMO, forcefully recruited unemployed urban youth into its 
ranks.  In this case, children were used by both the FRELIMO government and RENAMO. 
RENAMO believed that adults were not good fighters as compared to children and hence 
the consistent and systematic forced recruitment of children in its ranks. It preferred 
children because they were strong and had stamina, did not complain, could survive better 
in the bush and they easily followed orders. They could easily be turned into fierce fighters 
through brutal indoctrination where the child soldier was forced to kill someone known to 
him in his village. This was meant to close the door for the child to ever return to the 
village and further desensitizes them to suffering and makes them more likely to commit 
violent acts. Consequently RENAMO preferred children more than adult combatants. 
 
The recruitment pattern in Mozambique was far more consistent than in Angola with 
forced recruitment becoming more dominant. Some were abducted or kidnapped in their 
fields, at home or on their way to visit relatives while others got captured after attack on 
their town, villages or schools. Voluntary recruitment was present though not much. This 
was mainly at the beginning of the war when several chiefs voluntarily supported 
RENAMO. This resulted in the youth loyal and under their leadership joining the group. 
Some joined after being disillusioned by the government while others after being offered 
substantial payments by South African intelligence agents. It was also seen that 
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marginalised youth showed some voluntary adherence to RENAMO. This was as a result 
of economic marginalization due to the escalation of the war and the structural adjustment 
programmes which began in 1987.  Forced recruitment of children was widespread and the 
most common form of entry into RENAMO military ranks. Those who were deemed too 
old or too young for combat were used as porterage, messengers or servants for officers. 
Apart from forced recruitment or volunteering, other children were recruited into 
RENAMO while looking for employment in Malawi among the white people who were 
staying there. Other unemployed youths were recruited in Mozambique on the pretence of 
going to be offered employment or becoming illegal migrants in South Africa. FRELIMO 
conducted forced recruitment of young people perceived to be strong enough to fight. 
Students who were offered scholarships to study abroad ended up in military academies in 
the host countries while others were lured into special national programmes which turned 
out to conduct military training.  If not recruited by FRELIMO, children were supposed to 
join the militia or other groups of civilians who possessed guns and underwent training 
conducted by RENAMO. These youth were supposed to defend and secure their 
communities and villages against attack.  
 
In Angola, female combatants under UNITA served as domestics, assistants, and “wives” 
to soldiers. Women and girls were also forcibly given as “comfort women” to visiting 
guests in UNITA-held areas during the war. some were trained in pillaging techniques 
following an attack, loading and dismounting arms, defence techniques, accompanying 
male soldiers, sabotage, midwifery, welcoming, rousing, singing and dancing during 
special events. They were also used in transporting military goods during withdraw when 
under attack. After victory, the girls would dance with loud voice proclaiming victory. 
Sexual dances were also performed by girls to maintain male soldiers’ morale, and to 
ensure they remained awake and alert during critical times when enemy attack was 
imminent. It is believed that, it was following such celebration that girls would be sexually 
abused and given out to commanders as rewards for their bravery.  
 
Case Comparisons 
In Mozambique, apart from being trained how to use a gun, girl child soldiers were used 
for cooking, cleaning and growing crops for the men. RENAMO exploited women as 
reward to combatants. Moreover, they were also raped and used as slave wives by the 
soldiers who had special rights to women and girls. RENAMO promised the girls 
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scholarships to study abroad to attract them into its forces. It is noteworthy that girls in the 
front lines in Angola and Mozambique conscripted, abducted and gang press other girls 
into the armed groups. 
 
Given the above, it can be concluded that, the variation in the use of child soldiers in 
Angola and Mozambique is as a result of a number of factors some of which have been 
explained. The huge disparity in the number of child combatants involved is due to the 
very nature of contemporary armed conflicts. The Rebel groups UNITA and RENAMO 
lacked the institutional structures and means of control to account for their forces—
especially children and relied much on the information provided by the tactical level 
commanders without verification. The policy of villagization in Mozambique which 
became unpopular and forced many people into the communal villages encouraged many 
young people to join RENAMO because they wanted freedom and to live as they wanted 
rather than being forced to stay in the communal villages. Moreover, many people felt 
excluded and marginalized by the FRELIMO project and RENAMO capitalised on this 
discontent to persuade people politically of the need to overthrow FRELIMO.  As 
RENAMO was a party predominantly located in the peripheral rural areas where people 
felt excluded from the state, political sympathy contributed to the use of more child 
soldiers.  
 
The regular pattern of recruitment campaigns by RENAMO, with orders to round up 
children of between thirteen and seventeen years resulted in more children being recruited 
than in Angola. Further, the recruits and their parents were told that the children were 
being taken to do a ‘job’ and would later return home after the completion of the task. This 
became a very important tactic as most young people were unemployed and eager to work. 
Moreover, the payment of salaries to guerrillas by the Rhodesians in the early phase of the 
war attracted both young men and their parents to accept the war as ‘work’.  A significant 
number of children were taken by RENAMO when they came across them by chance while 
working in the fields, feeding animals or fetching food for the family. The migration of 
men to work in South Africa meant a shortage of adult men to fill the ranks and hence the 
subsequent recruitment of more children. The pro-rebel Mambos (chiefs) also encouraged 
children to join the rebels in the Central and Northern provinces as they had great authority 
and proclaimed that they could immunize them from bullets. 
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RENAMO’s policy of courting support from religious communities in an attempt to gather 
into its fold all those marginalized by FRELIMO is another reason why more child soldiers 
were used in Mozambique than in Angola.  Some soldiers integrated their religious beliefs 
into the war time work and some went to church before the war. This might have acted as a 
motivation factor for more children to join the war in Mozambique. RENAMO also 
targeted school dropout children and promised scholarships and jobs within the movement.  
 
The use of few child soldiers in Angola was likely mitigated by the involvement of Cuban 
soldiers and advisers as it is believed that about 50,000 Cuban troops participated in the 
war in support of the MPLA from 1975 to 1988.  The involvement of the US military 
mainly the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and South African troops who cooperated in 
support of UNITA against the MPLA offers another explanation as to why few child 
soldiers were used. These two actors were also involved in the recruitment of mercenaries.  
Private military forces (companies) and mercenary Special Forces units were also used in 
training the warring parties and in combat duties. Guerrilla veterans and former colonial 
troops were used in Angola. Fewer child soldiers were recruited as a lot of international 
actors were involved. 
 
The desertion of many soldiers in Angola which might have included child soldiers during 
the quartering and demobilisation which weakened the government army and reduced its 
strength between 1991 and 1992 also may have contributed to the smaller numbers of child 
soldiers. The bigger number of officers in Angola with secondary education than in 
Mozambique meant that they were in a better position to understand that it was against 
International Law to recruit and use children in war. Therefore, the above account justifies 
why more children were used in the Mozambican war than in the Angolan war.  
 
Way Forward  
The issue of using child soldiers in Africa will not end until the wars that drive child 
soldiering are prevented; managed and ultimately resolved. This is because the strategies 
used in today’s wars are meant to target and terrori e civilian populations more than the 
opposing army. Part of this strategy is the use of children to fight and conduct the most 
brutal forms of atrocities against civilian populations because of their innocence. One 
cannot therefore separate the use of children with the strategies of today’s wars. Unless 
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today’s wars are ended, all the movements and campaigns in the world may reduce child 
soldiering, but never end it.
251
  
 
Recommendations 
It is therefore recommended that: 
 There is need to continue raising awareness (human rights awareness) by educating 
people about the dangers of using children in armed conflicts; 
 Governments should develop educational and economic opportunities for children so 
that they are not lured by the rebels; 
 Support should be given to international and civil organisations as well as United 
Nations committees on the Rights of the Child, UNICEF, IRC etc in their efforts to 
eradicate the use of children under 18 years of age as soldiers; 
 The media should be encouraged to expose the use of child soldiers and the need for 
demobilization; 
 Those involved in the recruitment and usage of children as soldiers should be 
prosecuted and given stiff punishment.     
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